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Institutional Flip-Flops
Eric A. Posner* & Cass R. Sunstein**
Many people vigorously defend particular institutional judgments on such
issues as the filibuster, recess appointments, executive privilege, federalism, and
the role o f the courts. These judgments are defended publicly with great intensity
and conviction, but some o f them turn out to be exceedingly fragile in the sense
that their advocates are prepared to change their positions as soon as their
ideological commitments cut in the other direction. For example, institutional
flip-flops can be found when Democratic officials, fiercely protective o f the
filibuster when the President is a Republican, end up rejecting thefilibuster when
the President is a Democrat. Otherflip-flops seem to occur when Supreme Court
Justices, generally insistent on the need fo r deference to the political process,
show no such deference in particular contexts.
Our primary explanation is that many institutional flip-flops are a product
o f “merits bias, ” a form o f motivated reasoning through which short-term
political commitments make complex and controversial institutional judgments
seem self-evident (thus rendering those judgments vulnerable when short-term
political commitments cut the other way). We offer evidence to support the claim
that merits bias plays a significant role.
At the same time, many institutionaljudgments are essentially opportunistic
and rhetorical, and others are a product o f the need fo r compromise within
multimember groups (including courts). Judges might join opinions with which
they do not entirely agree, and the consequence can be a degree o f institutional
flip-flopping. Importantly, some apparent flip-flops are a result o f learning, as,
fo r example, when a period o f experience with a powerful president, or a
powerful Supreme Court, leads people to favor constraints. In principle,
institutional flip-flops should be reduced or prevented through the adoption o f
some kind o f veil o f ignorance. But in the relevant contexts, the idea o f a veil
runs into severe normative, conceptual, and empirical problems, in part because
the veil might deprive agents o f indispensable information about the likely effects
o f institutional arrangements. We explore how these problems might be
overcome.

* Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor and Arthur and Esther Kane Research
Chair, University of Chicago Law School.
** Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. We are grateful to William
Baude, Adam Chilton, Aziz Huq, Dan Kahan, Daryl Levinson, Michael Livermore, Jonathan Masur,
Jennifer Nou, David Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments. We are also grateful to
Mary Schnoor for outstanding research assistance and Arevik Avedian for helping to oversee the
various surveys discussed here.
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Introduction
What is the legitimate authority of the President, Congress, and the
Supreme Court? What is the proper relationship between the national
government and the states? Many people have firm views about such ques
tions. The puzzle is that in numerous cases, those responses seem to depend
on the answer to a single (and apparently irrelevant) question: who currently
controls the relevant institutions? Because the answer to that question
changes over time, history is full of what we shall call institutional flip-flops:
judgments that shift dramatically with changes in the political affiliations and
substantive views of those who occupy the offices in question.
Consider a few recent examples. Under President George W. Bush,
Democratic senators aggressively defended the use of the filibuster, while
Republican senators vigorously opposed it.1 Under President Barack Obama,
the two sides essentially flipped. Republican senators vigorously defended
the use of the filibuster, which was sharply opposed by Democrats.2
Or consider this question: does the President have broad power to make
recess appointments? Frustrated by Democratic opposition to many of his
nominees, President Bush certainly thought so.3 Many Republican senators
agreed while prominent Democratic senators did not.4 Under President

1. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Filibuster Fight Nears Showdown, N .Y . TIMES (May 8, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/08/politics/08judges.html
[http://perma.cc/VW3Y-WSN7]
(quoting Senator Charles Schumer defending the filibuster as part of “the age-old checks and
balances that the founding fathers placed at the center of the Constitution and the Republic,” and
reporting on Republican criticism of filibustering Democrats as “uncompromising obstacles to
popular legislation”).
2. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Democrats Poised to Limit Filibusters, Angering G.O.P., N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/us/politics/showdown-nears-in-senate
-over-filibusters-change.html [http://perma.cc/X6FR-49FQ] (reporting Democratic insistence on
limiting the filibuster to remedy “dysfunction,” while Republicans claimed that such limits would
“do irreversible damage to [the Senate as] an institution”). We acknowledge that there would be no
flip-flopping if a senator thought, “President X chose good people, whereas President Y chose
political hacks, and so I filibuster only the latter.” What we are identifying is not different evalua
tions of nominees, but different standards for evaluating them.
3. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate for the Second Time, Bush Seats Judge, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21,2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/21/us/bypassing-senate-for-second-timebush-seats-judge.html [http://perma.cc/F3YA-HNT5] (reporting on President Bush’s appointment
of Judge William H. Pryor Jr. during a weeklong Congressional recess); Jim Rutenberg, Bush Uses
Recess to Fill Envoy Post and 2 Others, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/04/05/washington/05bush.html?fta=y&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/BPL9-DQSC] (reporting on
President Bush’s appointment of Sam Fox, Andrew Biggs, and Susan E. Dudley during a similar
Congressional recess).
4. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 3 (reporting that “Republican Senate officials suggested .. . that
there may be more such recess appointments as a response to the Democrats’ tactic of using
filibusters or the threat of extended debates to block confirmation of the president’s judicial
nominees” while quoting Senator Charles Schumer as calling the recess appointment a
“questionably legal and politically shabby technique”); Rutenberg, supra note 3 (quoting thenSenator John Kerry’s statement that President Bush “abuse[d] the power of the presidency” by
appointing the ambassador to Belgium over the Senate’s objections).
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Obama, Republicans were outraged, and Democrats were supportive or
quietF Similarly, President Bush issued a large number of signing
statements, in which he asserted the constitutional prerogatives of the
President as the basis for questioning legislation that, in his view, intruded
on those prerogatives.56 Democrats vehemently objected to the use of signing
statements, in a way that seemed to signal a deep and enduring institutional
opposition to them. 7 By contrast, President Obama’s signing statements have
not produced much protest from Democrats8 (even though several involved
contested issues with respect to presidential authority to protect national
security) . 9
There is a closely related type of flip-flop where a person’s position on
an institutional question does not depend so much on who currently controls
the relevant institutions but on what particular political outcome will result.
Consider a lawsuit brought by the attorneys general of Nebraska and

5. See, e.g., David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in
Consumer Post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1 (reporting that Senate Democrats “defended the
administration’s move”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Bypasses Senate Process, Filling 15 Posts,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/us/politics/28recess.html
[http://perma.cc/98NP-F8Y5] (reporting a “flurry o f angry statements” from Republican Senators).
6. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1346 (Oct. 14, 2008) (“Provisions of the A c t. . .
purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the President’s ability to carry out his
constitutional obligations---- ”); Charlie Savage, Bush Declares Exceptions to Sections o f Two Bills
He Signed into Law, N .Y . TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/
Washington/15signing.html [http://perma.cc/9SFA-LQP7] (reporting on President Bush’s use of
signing statements to bypass parts of legislation that he viewed as unconstitutional constraints on
presidential power).
7. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Lawmakers to Investigate Bush on Laws and Intent, N .Y . TIMES
(June 20, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/washington/20cong.html [http://perma.ee/
8H4Q-ZMLJ] (quoting Senator Robert Byrd objecting to President Bush’s use of signing
statements: “Federal law is not some buffet line where the president can pick parts of some laws to
follow and others to reject.”).
8. See, e.g., K aren T um ulty, Obama Circumvents Laws with ‘Signing Statements, ’ a Tool He
Promised to Use Lightly, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), h ttp s://w w w .w ash in g to n p o st.co m /p o litics/
obama-circumvents-laws-with-signing-statements-a-tool-he-promised-to-use-lightly/2014/06/02/
9d76d46a-ea73-lle3-9f5c-9075d5508fDa_story.html [https://perma.cc/79ZY-NWE7] (quoting a
member of an American Bar Association panel criticizing the use of signing statements: “When
Bush was issuing signing statements, the Republicans didn’t care. When Obama was doing it,
Democrats didn’t care.”).
9. For institutional judgments, there is a pervasive possibility of path dependence, as when
people become committed to some such judgments at Time 1 and are therefore unwilling or unable
to extricate themselves at Time 2, thus reducing flip-flops. A prominent example might be New
Deal liberals of the 1930s and 1940s who adopted a firm position against an aggressive judicial role,
making it difficult for them to approve o f the role carved out by the Warren Court. Justice Felix
Frankfurter is probably the most famous case in point. Many theories o f judicial review are an effort
to respond to a charge of institutional flip-flopping. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
Seriously 131-32 (1977) (discussing the response to the Warren Court’s perceived flip to judicial
activism); John Hart Ely , D emocracy and D istrust : A T heory of J udicial Review 207
n.24 (1980) (discussing several commentators’ discomfort with the Warren Court’s judicial activism
and their reactions to some o f its decisions).

488

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 94:485

Oklahoma, seeking to block Colorado’s legalization of marijuana possession
on the ground that federal law criminalizes possession.10 These same
attorneys general have also argued that the Affordable Care Act is
unconstitutional because it violates states’ rights.*11 Critics argue that the
attorneys general have flip-flopped. “It is as if their arguments about
federalism and state autonomy were not arguments of principle but rather an
opportunistic effort to challenge federal policies they don’t like on other
grounds.”12 On this view, they are “fair-weather federalists”13 who promote
or deride federalism based on their views of the substantive political
outcomes at stake.
From these and other examples of real or apparent institutional flipflops, it is tempting to conclude (for example) that when some people make
broad and seemingly universal pronouncements about the importance of
respecting executive power, what they mean is that they like and trust the
current president. And when some legislators emphasize the importance of
allowing Congress to check the power of the President as such, they mean
that they dislike and distrust the current president. Their purportedly neutral
institutional judgments are motivated and determined by the occupant of the
office at the time that they are making those judgments.
We might also conclude that when people make an argument based on
federalism or executive primacy in some domain, they really mean that they
care about a specific policy outcome that happens to be advanced in that
particular instance by the states (as opposed to the national government) or
the President (as opposed to Congress). To say the least, it is disturbing if
firm and apparently timeless statements about institutional authority are in
fact an artifact of short-term judgments about substance and not institutions
at all.14
Some people might argue that the institutional flip-flops that we have
identified are not genuine flip-flops—that the apparent inconsistencies can
be explained away. As we will see, that argument is convincing for some,
but not all, of the examples. But even when it is right, another puzzle arises,
which is why people constantly accuse each other of flip-flopping when flipflops do not occur. The most plausible explanation is that real flip-flops
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 21, Nebraska v. Colorado (Dec. 18, 2014) (No. 144),
2014 WL 7474136, at *3, *21.
11. Shadee Ashtari, 11 GOP Attorneys General Criticize Obama For 'Flatly Illegal’
Obamacare Fixes, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2014, 1:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/0 l/03/attomeys-general-obamacare-illegal_n_4537104.html [http://perma.cc/A3BE-WSG8].
12. Jonathan H. Adler, Are Nebraska and Oklahoma Just Fair-Weather Federalists?, W a sh .
POST: VOLOKH C o n spir a c y (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/12/19/are-nebraska-and-oklahoma-just-fair-weather-federalists/
[http://perma.cc/4LFM-U63R].
13. Id.
14. We discuss below the complication introduced by the view that institutional judgments
must, in the end, be defended by their substantive effects.
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occur frequently enough to lend plausibility to accusations of flip-flopping
even when those accusations turn out to be spurious.
Institutional flip-flops, real or at least apparent, also play a role within
the Supreme Court. Within the federal judiciary, a flip-flop might result from
an overriding interest in who controls relevant institutions, or more broadly
on whose ox is likely to be gored—about the short-term substantive effect,
in the case at hand, of one or another approach to a disputed issue. Should
the Court defer to legislative fact-finding or to agency interpretations of law?
Should it follow the Constitution’s original meaning? Should it give the
political process the benefit of every doubt? Should it give respect to the
decisions of the states? On all of these questions, it is possible to find real or
apparent flip-flops.15
Particular examples will be controversial, because there may be
justifications for apparent inconsistencies (a point to which we shall return).
But to take a prominent and much-discussed example, many people who
abhor Lochner v. New York,16 seeing it as a form of illegitimate judicial
activism, are quite comfortable with Roe v. Wade}1 In the same week in
which Justice Antonin Scalia joined an opinion striking down § 4 of the
Voting Rights Act,ls he issued a wide-ranging dissenting opinion from the
Court’s decision to strike down the Defense of Marriage Act emphasizing the
importance of judicial restraint.19 Within the Court and the legal profession
generally, are institutional judgments a product of an assessment of the likely
composition of Supreme Court majorities? If so, is that a problem? Is it a
problem if Supreme Court Justices who are committed, in principle, to
following the original understanding fail to do so in cases that involve stand
ing, affirmative action, or commercial advertising (a species of institutional
flip-flopping)?
In the same vein, debates over national power are replete with at least
apparent institutional flip-flops. Those who believe that the federal govern
ment should have broad power to preempt state efforts in the domain of
immigration may be reluctant to conclude that the federal government should
have broad power to preempt state tort law.20 FIere, as in the judicial context,

15. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation o f Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. Rev . 823, 825-26 (2006) (observing that the
most conservative members of the Supreme Court are less likely to validate liberal agency statutory
interpretations and the least conservative members of the Court show the opposite pattern).
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it was Decided": Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677,689 (2005) (describing the arguments that connect
Lochner and Roe and how liberal scholars attempted to demonstrate that Lochner was consistent
with liberal judicial decisions in the 1970s).
18. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (decided June 25, 2013).
19. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697—98 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decided
June 26, 2013).
20. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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apparent inconsistencies of this kind can be justified once we specify the
appropriate principles. But in the area of preemption, as in other areas that
involve the relationship between the federal government and the states, the
driving force behind some people’s institutional judgments seems to be the
answer to this question: On the matter at hand, should we prefer the substan
tive judgments of the national government or instead the states? If that is
indeed the driving force, institutional flip-flops are inevitable, at least over a
sufficiently long period of time.
In principle, of course, the answers to institutional questions should not
depend on short-term considerations such as the political affiliations and
beliefs of those who currently occupy particular offices.21 The long-term
effect on the public interest is what matters. Some kind of veil of ignorance
might be invoked to provide enduring answers. The idea of the veil is that if
people imagine that they do not know their party affiliation, or even many of
their interests, they can more easily agree on the institutional norms that
would advance the public interest. In many contexts, however, there is a
pervasive problem: If we put ourselves behind such a veil, we might find it
exceptionally difficult to identify clear answers to institutional questions.
In the abstract, what is the right approach to the filibuster, recess
appointments, signing statements, preemption, or the exercise of moral judg
ments by the Supreme Court? It is in large part because of the difficulty of
answering such questions that people’s judgments tend to be overwhelmed
by short-term considerations of substance. More interestingly, the very idea
of a veil of ignorance runs into plausible objections because it seems to
deprive people of indispensable information. Nor is it exactly easy to encour
age participants in institutional debates to focus on the long term because of
the strong incentives they face to do otherwise.
Some people might even wonder whether flip-flopping is a significant
problem. Maybe the accusations of flip-flopping are often baseless, an easy
but unfair way to score political points against people who can provide
justifications for their changes in position. Even when it is real, flip-flopping
seems like a species of hypocrisy, and hypocrisy in politics is as old as
politics itself.22 In our view, however, flip-flopping accusations are so com-

21. We can imagine qualifications. Suppose, for example, that with a certain otherwise
appealing approach to institutional questions, the result would be certain catastrophe in the short
tenn. If so, it might seem best to avoid the catastrophe. Of course, there is a question whether
judges or others could take account of potential consequences of that kind. See JOSEPH Raz ,
PRACTICAL Reasons AND N orms 31M0 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990) (exploring “exclusionary
reasons” as negative second-order reasons—reasons to refrain from acting for some reasons).
22. Of course, there is a great deal of work exploring the phenomenon of hypocrisy in politics.
See, e.g., H annah Arendt , On Revolution 81, 96-106 (1963) (relating the history of hypocrisy
in politics); M artin Jay , T he Virtues of Mendacity : On L ying in P olitics 16 (2010)
(exploring the relationship between politics and mendacity); DAVID RUNCIMAN, POLITICAL
H ypocrisy : T he M ask of P ower , from Hobbes to O rwell and B eyond 12-15 (2008)

(chronicling the development of hypocrisy in modem political thought); JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
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mon only because the ubiquity of actual flip-flopping makes the accusations
credible. And flip-flopping causes distinctive harm, both because it leads to
unproductive debates and because it produces bad outcomes (sometimes in
the form of inaction).
Suppose, for example, that senators of one or another party block
presidential nominees because of an institutional position that they cannot
defend in neutral terms, or that federal courts invalidate agency action
because they dislike the president who is responsible for it (and thus abandon
a principle of deference that they would otherwise apply), or that rulemaking
agencies or courts preempt state law because of disagreement with its content
(and thus abandon principles of federalism that they would otherwise
respect), or that members of Congress object to an “imperial presidency,” and
take steps to cabin it, when their only real objection is to the substance behind
the current president’s decisions. In at least some of these cases, and possibly
in all of them, flip-flopping can produce significant damage.
Moreover, the flip-flop accusation often arises because the person in
question fails to explain his or her reasons in an adequate fashion. A justice
who praises the will of the people in decision A but then strikes down their
will in decision Y might have good legal reasons in each case, but we ought
to demand that the justice provide those reasons rather than inconsistent
rhetorical positions. As long as the justice is willing to strike down a statute,
the “will of the people” can never be a sufficient reason for a decision and is
most likely empty rhetoric.
As we shall see, continuous flip-flopping reveals disagreements about
institutional norms that ought to be resolved for the sake of good governance.
As we shall also see, flip-flopping is often a form of bad reasoning that should
be strongly discouraged. In the context of the judiciary, institutional flip
flopping can compromise rule of law values. Because accusations of flipflopping are as promiscuous as flip-flopping itself, it is important to
distinguish flip-flops from learning and other innocent forms of behavior.
Our principal goal in this Article is to elaborate on the concept of
institutional flip-flops and to explain why they are so pervasive. In Part I, we
provide examples and derive some typologies from them. In Part II, the heart
of the Article, we offer explanations. First, some flip-flops seem to be naive,
in the sense that people’s views about institutional values vary depending on
the short-term political outcomes they desire, but they may well be unaware
of that fact. In such cases, people’s short-term substantive commitments
have a kind of psychological priority, so much so that the supportive
institutional judgment (“of course the President camiot have that authority”)
seems self-evident, even if the opposing institutional judgment would seem
self-evident (“of course the President has that authority”) if the substantive
ORDINARY V ices 2-4 (1984) (expounding on hypocrisy and other vices and the role they play in
moral political society).
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commitments were otherwise. In such cases, institutional flip-flops result
from what we shall call merits bias, which amounts to a form of motivated
reasoning. We offer some empirical support for our claim that merits bias is
both real and important.
When merits bias is at work, people’s institutional judgments are
motivated by their substantive commitments. But it is also true that many
flip-flops among political insiders and judges are tactical. In such cases,
institutional arguments are made opportunistically, and hence it is no surprise
that they flip.
We also show that positions that may appear to be flip-flops may turn
out to be nothing of the sort. What is true for objections to apparent hypocrisy
is also true for objections to apparent flip-flopping: An investigation of
people’s actual beliefs might reveal that such objections have no merit. As
we have noted, some kind of principle might account for apparent flipflopping. Some people think that it is flip-flopping to favor aggressive
judicial protection of free speech rights without favoring aggressive judicial
protection of property rights, but familiar theories of constitutional
inteipretation might be invoked to show that there is no inconsistency. For
example, one might believe that free speech rights are necessary to protect
democratic self-government, while ordinary politics ensure sufficient
protection of property rights.23 If a judge has a particular theory of
constitutional interpretation, her apparently aggressive approach to one
statute might not be inconsistent with her apparently passive approach to
another.
The governing principle might be complex and fine grained, and once it
is identified, an apparent flip-flop might disintegrate. In addition, and
perhaps more interestingly, changes in institutional judgments might reflect
one or another form of learning. The most complex setting involves people’s
adjustments of their institutional commitments as a result of learning that
those commitments lead to unfortunate substantive outcomes (and not merely
in the short-term), thus justifying those adjustments.
In Part III, we explore a way forward. We argue that flip-flops arise in
the first place because it is difficult for people—as a matter of both
psychology and politics—to differentiate optimal institutional design (“the
rules of the game”) and the specific, short-term political outcomes they care
about, especially when in the midst of political debate. Yet the “gotcha”
response is unhelpful; changing one’s institutional views may well be
justified. In general, the best way to adjudicate alleged flip-flops is to enlist
the veil of ignorance— a device that forces people to evaluate institutional
arrangements abstracted away from their short-term substantive commit
ments. But in the relevant contexts, the idea of a veil runs into genuine
23. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9, at 105-06 (justifying the rationale for the judiciary to be heavily
involved in free speech rights).
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normative, conceptual, and empirical problems, in part because the veil might
deprive agents of indispensable information about the likely effects of
institutional arrangements. We explore what the veil of ignorance should be
taken to mean in this context and how those problems might be resolved.
I.

Examples and Typologies

A.

Flip-Flops: Real or Merely Apparent?

1. Relevant Distinctions.—An institutional flip-flop is a reversal of one’s
position on an institutional value based on partisan or political interests or
substantive commitments. Here is a way of specifying the idea: People flipflop when (1) at two distinct points in time they take different positions on
the validity of a claim of institutional authority for a set of policy decisions,
and (2) there are no relevant differences that would justify the shift.24
We distinguish two types of institutional flip-flops. A partisan
institutional flip-flop occurs when the reversal results from the change in
party control of the relevant institution. A Democrat who decries presidential
power when the president is a Republican and defends it when the president
is Democratic engages in a partisan institutional flip-flop. A substantive
institutional flip-flop occurs when the reversal results from differences or
changes in the policies of the relevant institutions. A conservative who
invokes federalism to defend states that restrict abortion but then invokes the
supremacy of national power when Congress limits same-sex marriage
engages in a substantive flip-flop (unless some principle is available to justify
the different invocations). While we note this distinction, we think that these
types of flip-flops are essentially the same phenomenon and will use
examples of both throughout our discussion.
It is important to begin by distinguishing between genuine flip-flops, in
which there is no neutral justification for the flip, and less clear cases, in
which a neutral justification can be identified, raising a question of whether
a flip-flop is involved at all. Suppose, for example, that a Democratic senator
vigorously defends filibustering federal judges who are nominated by a
Republican president, but later contends that it is unacceptable to filibuster
federal judges who are nominated by a Democratic president. If so, a flipflop is likely to be involved. In such cases, the institutional commitment
appears weakly held or even nonexistent: the senator’s position on the
legitimacy of the filibuster is wholly derivative of his views about the

24. We are grateful to Aziz Huq for help with this formulation. We are bracketing the question
whether there must be, in principle, a relevant difference, or whether it is sufficient for the agent to
believe that there is a relevant difference. For some purposes, the distinction might be real: An
agent might think, for example, that there is a difference between free speech rights and property
rights, but she might be wrong to do so. For most of our purposes here, the distinction generally
does not matter, but our discussion below of naive and tactical flip-flops suggests its relevance.
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President; and it is hard to identify a relevant difference between the two
situations that would justify the shift.25
The matter is far more complicated if a judge votes in favor of upholding
(say) the Affordable Care Act but not the Defense of Marriage Act. A critic
might be tempted to argue that the judge has flip-flopped, perhaps by taking
different positions on judicial authority, or on federalism and national power.
But in cases of this kind, we may have an apparent rather than real case of
flip-flopping. Different constitutional problems and provisions are involved,
and no simple position on judicial authority is likely to cut across problems
and provisions.
In the example at hand, for example, a judge might endorse some form
of democracy-reinforcing judicial review,26 calling for a deferential approach
to congressional action under the Commerce Clause (and hence to the
Affordable Care Act), but a more aggressive approach to the Equal Protection
Clause (and hence to the Defense of Marriage Act). So too, judges who vote
to invalidate a physical invasion of private property under the Takings Clause
need not be engaged in any kind of flip-flop if they vote to uphold restrictions
on commercial advertising. Perhaps those judges are originalists,27 and
perhaps their view of the original understanding calls for invalidation of
physical invasions but validation of restrictions on advertisements. If so, we
have no flip-flop at all.
2. A Possible Objection.—We will return to the role of neutral
justification below, but at the outset, it is important to explore a possible
objection. It is plausible to insist that on institutional questions, any par
ticular position has to be defended on some substantive ground. We might
favor an institutional judgment—say, a system of checks and balances of one
or another kind— on the ground that it will increase social welfare, or pro
mote democratic self-government, or increase national security, or safeguard
liberty. The Senate filibuster, or the presidential power to act unilaterally to
protect the nation against immediate threats, might be justified on one or
another such ground.

25. Perhaps the clearest flip-flops may be found among interest groups, whose influence rests
on raw political power rather than reasoned argument. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L.
Revesz, Interest Groups and Environmental Policy: Inconsistent Positions and Missed
Opportunities, 45 Envtl. L. 1,2-5 (2015) (discussing industry and environmental groups’ flip-flop
on marketable permit schemes).
26. See Ely, supra note 9, at 86-87, 105, 136 (arguing that judges should, when interpreting
the Constitution, do so in such a way as to reinforce representation).
27. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. ClN. L. Rev . 849, 856-57 (1989)
(discussing the difficulties of applying originalism and the doctrine’s requirements).
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Institutions are normally seen as arrangements that produce bundles of
expected policy outcomes— not as entities that are intrinsically appealing or
valuable in themselves.28 It is hardly embarrassing to support an institutional
arrangement with the claim that it will lead to good outcomes, all things
considered. In this light, we might be inclined to raise a question about the
whole category of institutional flip-flops. When people take one position on
the filibuster under a Republican president and another position under a
Democratic president, is this apparent inconsistency due to divergent
judgments about the consequences of filibusters? Is that a flip-flop at all? In
what sense?
Suppose that someone’s considered position is this: “I favor the
filibuster under Republican presidents, but not under Democratic presidents.”
Or this: “I approve of the legitimacy of aggressive signing statements by
Republican presidents, but not by Democratic presidents.” On this approach,
the expected (short-term) political commitments of the relevant institutions
are part and parcel of the governing institutional position. And indeed, we
shall give evidence that many people seem to think in these terms. But it is
noteworthy that they do not explain themselves in this way, which suggests
that views of this sort would be hard to defend publicly. In fact, they would
seem both self-serving and preposterous, because they would settle the rules
of the game by direct reference to the political views of the relevant players.
In public debate, people usually make institutional arguments that purport to
appeal across partisan divides and across disagreements about policy
outcomes; that is why no one would publicly argue that an institutional
arrangement is justified because it favors one party or leads to a specific
political outcome that is controversial.
On social-welfare grounds, reasonable people might refuse to play by
the rules of the game— and reject agreed-upon institutional norms— if and
because they lead to extremely bad outcomes. For example, we could imag
ine a view that would support a shift in institutional arrangements if political
power were suddenly obtained by fascists or communists. (Note, however,
that if fascists or communists really obtained power, an institutional shift on
the part of those who resisted them would be unlikely to take hold.) Some
people think that democrats in Egypt, after supporting the move to elections,
repudiated democracy when they saw that it could lead to Islamist rule .29
28. We are grateful to Adrian Vermeule for this formulation and for pressing this point. While
it is not impossible that some people believe that, for example, democracy and other fundamental
institutional arrangements are intrinsically, rather than, or as well as, instrumentally valuable, our
argument does not depend on whether institutional preferences are instrumental or noninstrumental.
29. See, e.g., Jackson Diehl, Opinion, Jackson Diehl: Egypt’s ‘Democrats’ Abandon
Democracy, WASH. POST (July 21,2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jackson-diehlegypts-democrats-abandon-democracy/2013/07/2 l/58beace0-efc8-11 e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d
_story.html [http://perma.cc/7KB2-2Q6P] (“What happened to Egypt’s young liberals? Five years
ago, they were the most promising [democratic] movement in [the] Arab world . . . . Now the vast
majority of them are cheering [the military coup] . . . .”).
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Moreover, any position on, say, the authority of the President and the federal
judiciary has to depend on the appropriate level of trust in those who occupy
the relevant offices. As new information arrives— including new information
about likely performance or preferences—judgments about appropriate
institutional authority might change, not least because predictions about the
effects of one or another allocation might change. As we will see, shifts of
that kind reflect learning. They might well be flip-flops, but there is nothing
dishonorable about them—a point to which we shall return.
B.

Political Debate

Within Congress, unambiguous institutional flip-flops are easy to find.
We have already catalogued a number of them. Many public officials have
switched position on both filibustering and signing statements, taking the
pro-executive side when their party holds the Presidency and rejecting that
side when the Presidency is held by the opposing party. An especially vivid
example can be found in 2013 and 2014, when the Senate’s Democratic
majority enacted filibuster reform that it vigorously resisted under President
Bush'0 and that met exceptionally fierce resistance from Senate Repub
licans31—who themselves flipped to support the reform when they attained a
m a jo rity .H ere is a confident prediction: If a Republican president is elected
in 2016, we will see further flips on these issues.
In a related case, Republicans objected when the Democrats used
reconciliation—a procedure normally used for budget bills which enabled
them to avoid the filibuster—in order to pass the Affordable Care Act in
2010.3' Yet Republicans had used reconciliation fourteen times since 1981

30. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use o f the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ll/22/us/politics/reid-sets-m-motion-steps-tolimit-use-of-filibuster.html?ref=politics [http://perma.cc/Q9DT-ZA9C] (reporting changes to the
Senate rules made by the Democratic majority that removed the minority party’s ability to filibuster
most presidential nominees); Jeremy W. Peters, New Senate Rules to Curtail the Excesses o f a
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/politics/bipartisanfilibuster-deal-is-reached-in-the-senate.html [http://perma.cc/8HGX-ABU8] (describing modest
changes to Senate procedural rules that limit the ability o f the minority to delay votes on bills and
some presidential nominations).
31. See 159 CONG. R e c . S8415-16 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
(“If you want to play games, set yet another precedent that you will no doubt come to regret. . . you
will regret this, and you may regret it a lot sooner than you think.”).
32. See Carl Hulse, Mitch McConnell’s New Senate Goal: Turn Republican Dial to Yes, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/us/politics/mitch-mcconnells-newsenate-goal-tum-republican-dial-to-yes.html [http://perma.cc/HEM7-XV46] (“McConnell does not
seem inclined to push ahead [on reversing the Democrats’ rule change lowering the threshold for
breaking a filibuster to a simple majority], despite earlier indications from him that Republicans
should do so.”).
33. See Jonathan Chait, A B rief Reconciliation Primer, N e w REPUBLIC (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/jonathan-chait/brief-reconciliation-primer
[http://perma.ee/
9YVK-C6ZY] (explaining that “[reconciliation is a legislative procedure for passing changes to
the budget . . . [which] only requires a majority in the Senate”); J. Taylor Rushing & Eric
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to pass legislation they cared about.34 After Republicans won a majority of
seats in the Senate in 2014, some of them proposed using reconciliation to
repeal the Affordable Care Act.35
For another example, consider the parties’ positions on war powers. In
1999, many Republicans in Congress objected when President Clinton sent
military forces into Serbia without congressional consent.36 They argued that
under the U.S. Constitution, the President may go to war only with the
consent of Congress; and under the War Powers Act, the President must
withdraw forces from hostilities if he has not received congressional
authorization.37 Many Republicans also complained when President Obama
used military force without congressional authorization against Libya and
threatened to do so against Syria.38 Yet Republicans did not object when
President Reagan used military force without congressional authorization in
Grenada, nor did they object when President George FLW. Bush used military
force without congressional authorization in Panama.39 Meanwhile, many

Zimmerman, Senate GOP: Dems Lack Votes to Use Partisan Tactic on Health Reform, HILL
(Feb. 20, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/82421-senate-gop-dems-donthave-votes-to-use-partisan-tactic-on-health-reform
[http://perma.cc/DX8M-B85P]
(reporting
McConnell’s claim that if Democrats used reconciliation, it “would be an acknowledgment that
there is bipartisan opposition” to the healthcare bill and a clear signal that Democrats had decided
to ignore the will of the American people).
34. Robert Farley, Reid Says Republicans Have Used Reconciliation More than Democrats,
POLITIFACT (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:37 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/
feb/25/harry-reid/reid-says-repblicans-have-used-reconciliation-more/
[http://perma.cc/TH4U2QWE],
35. Scott Wong, Republicans Eye Obscure Budget Tool to Repeal ObamaCare, HILL (Dec. 21,
2014, 5:00 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/227795-gop-eyes-obscure-budget-tool-torepeal-obamacare [http://perma.ee/2LZN-ZZTJ],
36. See John M. Broder, Clinton Says Force is Needed to Halt Kosovo Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/20/world/conflict-balkans-overview-clintonsays-force-needed-halt-kosovo-bloodshed.html
[http://penna.cc/5WSJ-5GQW] (quoting
a
Republican senator stating, on the Senate floor, that “[t]hey are going to come home in body bags,
and they will be killed in a war Congress has not declared”); Helen Dewar, Kosovo Policy Further
Strains Relations Between Clinton, Hill, WASH. POST (Mar. 27,1999), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/archive/politics/1999/03/27/kosovo-policy-further-strains-relations-between-clintonhill/f7837d3b-85b4-4733-b062-7f3c6fDa62c4/ [https://perma.cc/XG8H-C8GQ] (“The Senate
Republicans accused President Clinton of having . . . abused his power and ‘abrogated his
constitutional duty.’”).
37. See Bill Miller, Clinton’s War Powers Upheld, WASH. POST (June 9, 1999), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/june99/dismiss09.htm [http://perma.cc/T4GF-CQ2Z]
(describing a lawsuit filed by twenty-six members o f Congress against President Bill Clinton
contending that the U.S. military involvement in Kosovo was illegal because Clinton never obtained
congressional authorization).
38. See Charlie Savage, Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/affica/22powers.html [http://perma
,cc/G5LW-L9XT] (describing opposition to President Obama’s use of military force in Libya
originating from both Democratic and Republican members of Congress).
39. See Dan Balz et al., The Invasion o f Grenada, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 1983),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/26/the-invasion-of-grenada/18d2aa63f54f-4e76-932b-275fae48c3ea/ [http://perma.cc/XWN4-YJXJ] (reporting that Republicans “rallied
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Democrats objected to these uses of unilateral presidential power by
Republican presidents40 and did not complain when President Obama used
military force without congressional consent in Libya41 nor when President
Clinton did so in Serbia.42
The parties also appear to flip-flop over the relevance of statutory
constraints on other presidential powers. During the George W. Bush
administration, prominent congressional Democrats complained that Bush
disregarded statutes that restricted interrogation practices, surveillance, and
criminal prosecution of detainees alleged to be terrorists.43 During the
Obama administration, prominent congressional Republicans have
complained that Obama has disregarded immigration, education, and health
statutes.44 In a short time, we have thus witnessed a dramatic partisan flipflop over whether the Presidency has become too powerful— whether an
imperial presidency exists that needs to be reined in.45 Of course some people

around President Reagan’s decision to invade the island o f Grenada”); Thomas L. Friedman,
Fighting in Panama: Reaction; Congress Generally Supports Attack, but Many Fear Consequences,
N.Y. T im es (Dec. 21, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/21/world/fighting-panamareaction-congress-generally-supports-attack-but-many-fear.html [http://perma.cc/RHL2-WXB7]
(explaining that most Republicans adhered to a view o f “strong support” for Bush’s decision).
40. See Balz et ah, supra note 39 (reporting that most Republicans felt Reagan’s actions were
justified but that Democrats were divided on the issue); Friedman, supra note 39 (quoting Democrat
Charles Rangel criticizing President Bush’s military action in Panama: “As much as I would like to
get rid of the bum in Panama, I don’t see the legal authority of the use of the military.”).
41. Jeff Zeleny, Airstrikes in Libya; Questions Back Home, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/2 l/world/africa/2 lprexy.html
[http://perma.cc/JXB8-AD92]
(noting that “[t]he action against Colonel Qaddafi’s forces drew support from many Democrats” but
also drew concern from some liberal Democrats about congressional authorization).
42. See Dewar, supra note 36 (“As many Democrats see it, the Republican attacks on Clinton’s
Kosovo policy arise more from a sense that Clinton has largely escaped injury on domestic issues,
leaving foreign policy as a weakness worth exploring.”).
43. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Democrat Says Spy Briefings Violated Law, N .Y . TIMES (Jan. 5,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/05/politics/05nsa.html
[http://perma.cc/575F-6ZF5]
(reporting that a “top Democrat” on the House Intelligence Committee wrote a letter to President
Bush complaining that the limited congressional briefings the Bush Administration had provided
on an eavesdropping program violated the law); Jonathan Weisman, Bush's Challenges o f Laws He
Signed is Criticized, W a s h . POST (June 28, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/27/AR2006062700145.html [http://perma.cc/JK39-CZDZ] (highlight
ing that Democrats “blast[ed]” President Bush’s use o f signing statements and reporting that a
Democratic Senator deemed Bush’s use of signing statements as “a grave threat to our constitutional
system of checks and balances”).
44. See Eric Posner, Boehner’s Lawsuit Against Obama is a Loser, Sla te (July 11,2014, 12:46
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/07/boehner_
s_lawsuit_against_obama_is_a_loser_because_of_american_ideas_about.html
[http://perma.ee/
6WU3-D3KG] (analyzing House Speaker John Boehner’s effort to “sue President Obama for
overstepping the limits of executive authority” and highlighting that Obama’s critics argue that “in
addition to Obamacare, the president has refused to enforce the immigration laws” and “has issued
waivers to states freeing them from compliance with the test score requirements o f No Child Left
Behind”).
45. See, e.g., Lauren Camera, Obama Education Policies Add Fuel to Lawsuit Bid, EDUC. Wk .
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/011awsuit.h34.html [http://perma
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have a general objection to what they see as excessive presidential authority,
cutting across partisan divides.46 What we are emphasizing here is that in the
public domain, institutional flip-flops are pervasive.
It is true that some of these cases may involve apparent rather than real
flip-flops. Democrats objected that Bush exceeded his constitutional war
powers .47 Republicans tended to argue that Obama violated relevant statutes
by underenforcing them in a manner inconsistent with the prosecutorial
discretion that is vested in the President.48 With their various views on these
particular issues, both Democrats and Republicans need not have flipflopped. Without flip-flopping, one might believe that the President has
broad authority over the use of force without having broad authority not to
enforce domestic legislation. It is thus possible, depending on one’s views
about the President’s constitutional authority, to believe that neither party
flip-flopped (or that both did). But to say the least, politicians have not tried
very hard to show that their positions have been consistent, and in some cases,
the inconsistency has been palpable.

.cc/237Z-6SNM] (describing a lawsuit filed by House Republicans accusing President Obama of
abusing his legal authority through his executive actions and waiving of work requirements for
welfare recipients under the No Child Left Behind Act); Katie Zezima & Robert Costa, Republicans
Challenge Obama’s Executive Actions, File Lawsuit over Obamacare, WASH. POST (Nov. 21,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/republicans-call-obama-executive-actionsdamaging-to-presidency-file-lawsuit-over-obamacare/2014/11/21/d3720d0e-7192-11 e4-893 f86bd390a3340_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q7GD-LUBF] (describing a lawsuit filed by House
Republicans accusing President Obama of violating immigration statutes and the Affordable Care
Act).
46. For an early version, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., T h e IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973). See also DANA D. NELSON, B ad FOR DEMOCRACY: HOW THE PRESIDENCY UNDERMINES
THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE 4 -5 (2008) (arguing that presidentialism, a concept used to describe
how we look at the sitting president for national strength and unity, “encourages citizens to believe
that their democratic agency depends on presidential power, instead o f the other way around” and
that these trained feelings can pull us in powerfully antidemocratic directions); ANDREW
RUDALEV1GE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER
WATERGATE 285 (2005) (concluding that although the executive office has received a lot o f
renovation, both by those who have held it and those who have beheld it, it cannot be said to be
complete and that writing “a happy ending— to ensure that presidential power does not become
presidential government— is the task o f all those concerned with the American experiment in
democracy”); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 328-29 (2007) (contending that the President to be
sworn in on January 20, 2009, whether a Democrat or Republican, would inherit all the “new and
expanded executive powers created by the Bush-Cheney W hite House” and that this President’s
choices will play an “important role in the unfolding story o f the executive branch’s attempted
takeover o f the Am erican government”).
47. See Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Basis fo r Spying in U.S. is Doubted, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,

2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/politics/07nsa.html [http://perma.cc/YCW4-N6QG]
(explaining that many Democrats pointed to findings by the Congressional Research Service as
“perhaps the strongest indication that [President] Bush might have exceeded his authority in fighting
terrorism”).
48. See Savage, supra note 38 (noting that many Republican lawmakers shared the sentiment
that President Obama had exceeded his constitutional authority by authorizing the attacks o f Libyan
air defenses and government forces without congressional permission).
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Constitutional Law

Within the Supreme Court, it is also easy to find at least apparent flipflops, especially on the question of whether judges should defer to the
political process. In United States v. Windsor,49 for example, a majority of
the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which denied federal tax and related benefits to same-sex married couples.50
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, ruled that DOMA violated the Equal
Protection Clause because Congress had singled out persons in same-sex
marriages for disparagement.51 In his dissent, Justice Scalia complained that
the Court’s holding would distort “democracy” by interfering with the public
debate on same-sex marriage.52 “We might have let the People decide,” he
lamented.55 And yet in two other cases decided the same week, Justice Scalia
joined opinions that did not let the People decide but struck down duly
enacted statutes or programs— § 4 of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County
v. Holder54 and the affirmative action program at issue in Fisher v. University
o f Texas at Austin.55 In its various forms, the phrase “We might have let the
People decide” seems to be used opportunistically.
Justice Kennedy launched his discussion of the merits in Windsor with
a paean to the federalist system and the central role of states in defining
marriage,56 and yet in Fisher, he wrote a majority opinion that did not explore
the possibility that Texas may have an interest in experimenting with
affirmative action programs or that states play a traditional role in deter
mining educational policy.5' Justice Ginsburg wrote an eloquent dissent in
Shelby County noting the importance of giving “deference” to congressional
fact-finding while joining Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor, which
gave Congress’s views on same-sex marriage no deference at all.58
We surveyed colleagues for their favorite (or least favorite) example of
institutional flip-flops in the Supreme Court. We offer them here not

49. 133 S. 0 .2 6 7 5 (2 0 1 3 ).
50. Id. at 2695-96.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2710 (Scalia, I , dissenting) (contending that the result of the Court’s holding will be
a “judicial distortion o f our society’s debate over marriage” because prior to this decision, there had
been “plebiscites, legislation, persuasion, and loud voices— in other words, democracy” on all sides
of the issue that was before the Court).
53. M a t 2711.
54. 133 S. Ct. 2612,2631 (2013) (decided June 25,2013).
55. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (decided June 24, 2013).
56. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92.
57. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415-22 (holding that a university’s affirmative action policy is
subject to strict scrutiny while making no mention of a state’s traditional role in developing its
education policies).
58. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681-82.
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necessarily as real rather than apparent illustrations—no flip-flop is neces
sarily involved—but as reflecting a sense of the terrain offered by specialists.
Among the notable answers:
1. Bush v. Gore and Federalism.—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor, two of the Court’s most vigorous advocates of federalism,59
joined a majority opinion that disregarded Florida election law and handed
the 2000 presidential election to George W. Bush.60 Dissenters, including
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, emphasized the value of federalism, which had
not been a defining feature of their other opinions.61
2. Federalism and Preemption.—Similarly, conservative Justices who
advocate federalism— in addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O ’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas— are the most likely to find
preemption of state law when business interests are at stake, causing liberal
justices who vote the other way to accuse them of flip-flopping, and exactly
the same charge could be made against those same liberal Justices, who are
normally less enthusiastic about the rights of states.62
3. Lawrence v. Texas and Stare Decisis.—Justice Kennedy delivered an
opinion in Planned Parenthood o f Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey6' that
provided an elaborate justification for stare decisis in explaining why he
would not overturn Roe v. Wade.64 But then in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 he

59. Their advocacy of federalism can be seen in cases such as Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452,459 (1991) (“In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (holding that the Constitution “divides power
among sovereigns . . . precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day”); and N a t’l League o f Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (striking down a section of a federal statute which “operate[d] to directly
displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions”). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding a federal statute
unconstitutional which required state law enforcement agents to participate in a federal regulatory
program). For a useful discussion, see generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 4 1 UCLA L. R e v . 903 (1994), which defines federalism, argues
that federalism interrupts rather than promotes the diffusion of governmental power, and asserts that
federalism disrupts national community.
60. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (reversing the Supreme Court o f Florida’s
judgment ordering a recount of the ballots, holding “there is no recount procedure in place under
the State Supreme Court’s order that comports with minimal constitutional standards”).
61. See id. 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (denouncing the Court for not deferring to the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court in the interpretation o f state law); id. at 146-47 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (contending that a Florida court, rather than the Supreme Court, should make decisions
under Florida law).
62. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court ’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEXAS L, REV. 1097, 1167-68 (2006).
63. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
64. Id. at 853-69.
65. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

502

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 94:485

disregarded the recent precedent of Bowers v. Hardwick66 in the course of
striking down a law that criminalized sodomy between people of the same
sex.67
4. Printz and Textualism.—Justice Scalia is famous for his advocacy of
textualism, the doctrine that judicially enforced norms must be grounded in
the text of statutes or the Constitution.68 Yet in Printz v. United States,69 he
found that a statute that required state officials to enforce federal gun-control
regulations unconstitutional despite the absence of any textual ban on
“commandeering.”70 Empirical research suggests that Justices sometimes
invoke interpretative canons opportunistically while achieving ideologically
preferred results.71
5. The First Amendment and Originalism.—Justice Scalia is the Court’s
most vigorous proponent of the doctrine of originalism, and Justice Thomas
has proclaimed himself an adherent of that doctrine on numerous occasions.72
They have written numerous opinions based on originalist arguments.73 Yet
few scholars believe that they have given persuasive originalist justifications
for their claims that the First Amendment blocks campaign-finance regula-

66. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
67. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overruling Bowers and concluding that the statute, which
criminalized same-sex sodomy, was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause).
68. See Antonin Scalia, The Rale o f Law as a Law o f Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. Re v . 1175, 1185
(1989) (advocating the benefits of adopting a judicial approach that requires statutory or
constitutional bases when evaluating whether a certain concept is an established social norm).
69. 521 U.S. 898(1997).
70. Id. at 925-33.
71. Lawrence M. Solan, Response, Opportunistic Textualism, 158 U. PA . L. REV. PE N N U M B R A
225, 233-34 (2010), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra225.pdf [http://perma.ee/B3H5-KGBH],
72. 60 Minutes: Justice Scalia on the Record (CBS television broadcast Apr. 27, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-on-the-record/ [http://perma.cc/RS94-6N3P]; see,
e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Commerce Clause
empowers Congress to regulate the buying and selling of goods and services trafficked across state
lines. The Clause’s text, structure, and history all indicate that, at the time of the founding, the term
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”)
(citations omitted); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more
consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state
police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.”).
73. See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The relevant and inescapable point is this: No court ever held, and indeed no one ever
thought, prior to our decisions in Elrod and Brand, that patronage contracting could violate the First
Amendment.”)', BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At
the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that punitive damages
represent the assessment by the jury, as the voice o f the community, o f the measure of punishment
the defendant deserved.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (advocating tempering the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence such that it is more
faithful to the original understanding o f the Commerce Clause).
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tions,74that the Fourteenth Amendment blocks affirmative action programs,7"
or that Article III forbids Congress from conferring standing on citizens.76
Frequently, they say nothing at all about the original understanding of the
relevant constitutional provisions.77
6. Boumediene and Congressional Authorization o f Emergency
Measures.—In his one-page concurrence in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldf Justice
Breyer explained that the Court’s ruling that the executive lacked the auth
ority to try A1 Qaeda suspects in military commissions was based on a simple
principle: “Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”70 But
when Congress took out its checkbook and authorized military commissions
in the Military Commission Act, Justice Breyer joined an opinion that struck
down a provision in the Act on the ground that it violated the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution.80
7. Delegation and Chevron.—In Clinton v. City o f New York, 81 the
Supreme Court struck down the line-item-veto statute as an impermissible
delegation of legislative power to the President.82 Yet the author of the
majority opinion—Justice Stevens—also wrote the majority opinion in
Chevron,83 which provided the legal foundations of the administrative state

74. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,386 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992); see, e.g., Marvin H. Lett, Grutter.
Gratz, and Affirmative Action: Why No “Original” Thought?, 1 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 417, 423
(2005) (claiming the Supreme Court did not look to “original understanding” in the Grutter case);
William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance o f
Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1258 n.49 (2011)
(stating the original meaning of the First Amendment does not support the Citizens United holding);
Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials o f an Occasional Originalist, 70 U.
COLO. L. Rev . 953, 969 (1999) (claiming Scalia ignored originalism in fashioning new Article III
doctrine in Lujan).
77. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-49 (Scalia, J., concurring) (failing to argue any originalist
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
78. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
79. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
80. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008).
81. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
82. Id. at 421.
83. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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by holding that courts must defer to Executive Branch statutory interpreta
tions based on congressional delegations of legislative powers to regulatory
agencies controlled by the President.84
8. Rules, Standards, and Sebelius.—In Caperton v. Massey?5 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote a dissent criticizing the majority’s holding that a state
judge was required to recuse himself when his actions create a “probability
of bias,” pointing out that this standard “fails to provide clear, workable
guidance for future cases,” and then listing forty interpretative questions that
the standard raises.86 Yet Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in NFIB v.
Sebelius87 that Congress’s commerce power does not extend to economic
“inactivity”88 creates at least as many interpretative questions. (We can think
of forty-one but will not list them.)
II.

Explanations

A.

Naive Flip-Flops, Merits Bias, and Motivated Reasoning

1. Empirical Tests.—A naive flip-flop is one in which a person’s
institutional beliefs depend on the identity of the person or party currently in
power or on the short-term substantive outcome that follows from a particular
institutional configuration. Recall the example of a Democratic senator who
supports aggressive use of the filibuster when the president is a Republican,
but who deplores such use when the president is a Democrat. If the senator
genuinely believes that the filibuster is legitimate when the president is a
Republican, and genuinely believes that the filibuster is illegitimate when the
president is a Democrat, then the senator has engaged in a naive flip-flop.89
One might doubt whether the beliefs of real people could be so unstable.
We conducted our own empirical test of that question. Using Amazon
Mechanical Turk, we asked about 200 people this question:
President Bush was often blocked by the Democratic Senate, which
frequently refused to confirm his nominees. Frustrated by its intransi
gence, he resorted to “recess appointments,” which bypass the Senate
by installing nominees while the Senate is out on what President Bush
considered a “Senate recess.” Do you think that President Bush did
the right thing?

84. See id. at 843-44 (giving “controlling weight” to regulations, “unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
85. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
86. Id. at 893-98.
87. Nat'l Fed’n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
88. Id. at 2589.
89. Subject to a possible learning explanation that we discuss below.
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A strong majority of Republicans (58%) thought that he did. By
contrast, a strong majority of Democrats thought that he did not (68%).90
We asked a different group of people the same question, with just one
difference: the name “Obama” was substituted for the name “Bush.” With
that change, the vast majority of Republicans (89%) opposed the recess
appointments, whereas the strong majority of Democrats (66%) supported
them.91 Though the result is not unambiguous, the best explanation is that
people’s institutional judgments are rooted in their beliefs about the merits.92
We conducted a second empirical test using a different question:
In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush was
sometimes concerned that legislation, enacted by Congress, intruded
on his constitutional authority in the area of national security. Bush
issued “signing statements,” which set out his own views. Some of
Bush’s signing statements said that he would ignore congressional
enactments that did, in his view, intrude on his authority. Do you
approve of such signing statements?
This time only 37% of Republicans said that they approved of signing
statements—perhaps because of the current unpopularity of President Bush
(even among Republicans), or perhaps because of a general concern among
Republicans during the Obama Administration about presidential over
reaching. But this was considerably more than the 20% of Democrats who
said they approved of signing statements.93
When the same question was asked about Obama rather than Bush, the
difference became very stark: 68% of Democrats said they approved of
signing statements, while only 16% of Republicans approved of signing
statements.94 As before, with both parties, a person was much more likely to
support an institutional practice (signing statements) if it benefited a sameparty president. While, unlike in the first case, a majority of Republicans
rejected signing statements even when Bush used them, our results
nonetheless show flip-flopping among numerous Republicans as well as
Democrats.
Turning to constitutional law, we asked a large group of subjects the
following questions: (1) Do you support same-sex marriage? And (2) Do you
believe that the Constitution permits Congress to ban same-sex marriage
throughout the country? The first question calls for a substantive judgment;
the second calls for an institutional judgment with a constitutional
90. N= 200; p < 0.01, meaning a high level of statistical significance.
91. 1V= 230;p < 0.01.
92. The reason that the result is not unambiguous is that the words “the right thing” can be taken
in more than one way. Some respondents might have thought that the question invited a substantive
judgment, rather than an institutional one. But the structure of the question strongly suggests that
an institutional judgment was sought.
93. 1V= 203;p < 0.01.
94. N = 239; p < 0.01.
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foundation. Our hypothesis was that people who support same-sex marriage
will believe that Congress cannot ban it and that people who oppose samesex marriage will believe that Congress can ban it.
The results strongly support this hypothesis. Among same-sex marriage
supporters, only 10% believed that Congress could ban it; 90% believed that
Congress could not ban it. Among opponents, 49% believed that Congress
could ban same-sex marriage; 51% believed that Congress could not ban it.95
We also asked the inverse of question (2), namely: Do you believe that
the Constitution permits Congress to require all states to recognize same-sex
marriage? Again, supporters of same-sex marriage were much more likely
to believe that Congress possesses this power (69%) than opponents (6%).96
2. Motivated Reasoning and Institutional Judgments.—We interpret
these results to mean that people’s views on the merits influence and
sometimes decide their positions on institutional questions. Republicans are
more likely to believe that George W. Bush had the legal power to make
recess appointments or issue signing statements than Barack Obama does,
because Republicans are more likely to trust Bush to use those powers wisely.
Democrats thought similarly. People’s view on the merits of same-sex
marriage strongly influences their positions on the institutional question of
congressional power.
We suggest that naive flip-flops reflect the phenomenon of merits bias,
through which people sincerely accept an institutional position that fits with
their substantive commitments.97 In such cases, the institutional position is
motivated in the sense that it is a product of those commitments; but agents
are not aware of that fact. If, for example, members of Congress are
genuinely hostile to the incumbent president and believe that his own
positions are threatening to freedom and self-government, they are far more
likely to accept, and even to find self-evident, an institutional position that
fits with those views. But if they trust that president— if, for example,
Democratic senators are asked whether they want to deny authority to a
Democratic president—that same institutional position might seem
preposterous. If a Democratic president acts unilaterally, Democratic
legislators might think that he is reasonably exercising his authority in the
face of a “broken system.” But if a Republican president acts unilaterally,
Democratic senators might insist that he is violating the system of checks and
balances. In fact, both the flip and the flop might seem self-evidently correct.

95. N =200; p < 0.01.
96. 7V= 201; p < 0.01.
97. As discussed below, any judgment about an institutional issue must, in the end, turn on
some kind of substantive judgment. We are understanding the idea o f “substantive commitments”
in a narrower sense— not as connoting an ultimate justification for an institutional arrangement, but
as separate and often short-term commitments to some kind o f outcome that influence an
institutional judgment.
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Similarly, when people believe that Congress supports their views about
same-sex marriage, abortion rights, and so on, and the states do not, they are
likely to reject objections to national legislation based on federalism. When
people believe that the states take their views more seriously, they are likely
to invoke federalism as a reason that Congress should not override state law.
In our view, merits bias is pervasive in politics and law, and it helps to
account for institutional flip-flops and other puzzling judgments, plausibly
including the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore,98
Merits bias is consistent with a significant body of psychological
research, emphasizing the pervasive role of motivated reasoning." If, for
example, fans of a particular football team—say, the New England Patriots—
watch a game, they are likely to be systematically biased in their assessment
of the referee’s neutrality. 100 Typically they will see the referee as favoring
the opposing team . 101 Their judgment to this effect is entirely sincere, even
though they would have a quite different assessment if they rooted for that
opposing team. Notably, they are blind to their own bias . 102 Motivated
reasoning can be found in countless contexts, including politics and law . 103
98. 531 U.S. 98, 100-11 (2000).
99. For the classic account, see generally Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a
Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). See also Ziva Kunda, The
Case fo r Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 494 (1990) (suggesting that people seek
out information to bolster their existing, biased opinions); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark R.
Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects o f Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2103-04 (1979)
(presenting results that indicate individuals with different social beliefs come to opposite
conclusions about the same data); Diana C. Mutz, Political Psychology and Choice, in T h e OXFORD
H a n d b o o k o f P o l it ic a l B e h a v io r 80, 87-88 (Russell J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann
eds., 2007) (explaining that motivated-reasoning models must take into account a focus on goals
rather than accuracy).
100. For the seminal study demonstrating a phenomenon o f this sort, see Hastorf & Cantril,
supra note 99, at 130-32, which shows that after Dartmouth used rough tactics in a football game
against Princeton, Princeton students “saw . . . twice as many infractions” being made by the
Dartmouth players, while Dartmouth students reported that “both sides were to blame” and that both
teams had committed “the same number o f infractions.” See also Kunda, supra note 99, at 488
(explaining that fans of winning teams and fans of losing teams assigned different interpretations to
a “fluke” event that occurred during the game); Samuel McNemey, Cognitive Biases in Sports: The
Irrationality o f Coaches, Commentators and Fans, SCI. Am . (Sept. 22, 2011), http://blogs
.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2011/09/22/cognitive-biases-in-sports-the-irrationality-ofcoaches-commentators-and-fans/ [http://perma.cc/EFD5-9VCV] (discussing how coaches, like
most people, ignore information that is contradictory to their biased intuitions, a psychological
phenomenon known as “confirmation bias”).
101. Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 99, at 130-32 (discussing how opposing fans perceived
fairness in the same football game).
102. See, e.g., Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perception o f Bias in S e lf Versus
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 371-73 (2002) (demonstrating that
participants generally viewed themselves as less susceptible to bias than others).
103. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term — Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems fo r Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. Rev . 1, 19—26
(2011) (discussing motivated reasoning: the propensity “to process information in a manner that
suits” a preferred outcome). For related work by Kahan and his coauthors, see for example Dan M.
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What we are suggesting here is that people’s assessment of institutional
issues is often motivated as well.
Related research finds that people’s willingness to accept outcomes
based on institutional legitimacy is overridden when those outcomes are truly
objectionable.104 In such cases, the fact that the “right” institution reached
that outcome drops out as a normative consideration.105 Similarly, people
tend to emphasize the substantive valence, not institutional considerations, in
deciding whether Congress or instead courts should produce certain out
comes.100 When people care greatly about the substance, their institutional
judgments do not much matter.107
3. An Analogy.—Consider an analogy, involving the use of party
affiliation as a kind of heuristic.108 In a relevant study, people—both
Democrats and Republicans—were asked their views about several issues
involving welfare reform and related issues.109 In one experiment, a group
of subjects was asked whether they favored a generous welfare policy (with

Kahan et al., “They Saw a P ro te stC o g n itiv e Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64
S T A N . L. Re v . 851, 859 (2012), which asserts that individuals are more likely to trust and
incorporate information in line with their “cultural values”.
104. See Linda J. Skitka et al., Limits on Legitimacy: Moral and Religious Convictions as
Constraints on Deference to Authority, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 567, 568-69 (2009)
(arguing that people are less likely to consider institutional authority when it conflicts with their
“personal [sense of] right and wrong”).
105. See Christoper W. Bauman & Linda J. Skitka, Moral Disagreement and Procedural
Justice: Moral Mandates as Constraints to Voice Effects, 61 AUSTRALIAN J. PSYCHOL. 40, 47
(2009) (supporting the idea that “morality” impacts how people approach “questions o f justice”);
Skitka, supra note 104, at 568-69.
106. See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from
a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 734 (2012) (suggesting people consider personal
opinions about a result rather than what institution produced the result). Fontana & Braman’s
findings—that people’s cultural priors, rather than their institutional preferences, determine their
support for political outcomes— could also explain certain kinds of flip-flopping. Id. at 760. Our
focus is not the influence of people’s cultural priors on their institutional preferences, but rather the
influence of their preferences for specific policy outcomes on their institutional preferences.
107. We should acknowledge that it is possible, at least as a matter o f logic, that the causal
direction could go the other way. People start off with a strong position about how much Congress
can legislate about marriage, and this position influences their beliefs about the merits of same-sex
marriage. On this interpretation, people suffer from a cognitive bias that causes their abstract
commitments to congressional power or federalism to influence their views about substantive issues
like same-sex marriage, abortion, and the like. This interpretation strikes us as deeply implausible
for a simple reason: most institutional commitments (for example, a belief that Congress can
overrule the states on marriage) imply exactly nothing about one’s substantive views (for or against
same-sex marriage, abortion rights, the death penalty, minimum wage laws).
108. Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact o f Group Influence on
Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 813 (2003). For a more recent paper
that surveys the literature and offers additional experimental results, see John G. Bullock, Elite
Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate, 105 Am . POL. SCI. Rev . 496, 513 (2011),
which found that cues from party elites do not fully displace people’s reliance on information about
policies.
109. Cohen, supra note 108, at 809.
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high levels of benefits), and another group was asked whether they favored a
strict policy (with much lower levels of benefits) . 110 Not surprisingly,
Democrats tended to favor the generous policy, while Republicans tended to
favor the strict policy. *111
Otherwise identical groups were then asked about the same issues, but
with one difference: They were informed of the views of party leadership. 112
The effect of that information was significant. Regardless of whether the
policy was generous or stringent, Democrats tended to favor that policy if
they were told that it was favored by Democratic leadership. 113 Republicans
showed the same pattern. 114 Armed with information about the views of their
party’s leadership, people departed from the views that they would have held
if they had not been so armed. Stunningly, the effect of the information
“overwhelmed the impact of both the policy’s objective content and
participants’ ideological beliefs.” 115 At the same time, people were blind to
that impact, they actually said that their judgments were based solely on the
merits, not on the effects of learning about the beliefs of party leaders. 116
Flere, then, is clear evidence of the consequences of party affiliation for
people’s judgments—and of people’s unawareness of that fact. 117
This is an analogy, not an identity. Many people do take the views of
party leadership as a kind of heuristic, overwhelming their own private
judgments. Use of the “party heuristic” might be purely cognitive (even if it
is relatively automatic), and it need not involve any kind of motivated
reasoning. With merits bias, by contrast, people resolve hard institutional
questions, on which they may have no particular views, by reference to their

110. Id. at 812-13.
111. Id. at 812, 814; see also David Tannenbaum et al., On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioral
Policy Interventions 10-11 (May 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://home.uchicago.edu/
davetannenbaum/documents/partisan%20nudge%20bias.pdf
[http://perma.cc/56VF-WUAL]
(finding that people’s reactions to the use of certain tools for influencing behavior—such as
“nudges”—appear to be strongly influenced by the political valence of the particular use).
112. Cohen, supra note 108, at 812-13.
113. Id. at 812.
114. Id. at 814.
115. Id. at 808.
116. Id. at 812, 815.
117. We should note that the studies we cite use ordinary people rather than experts, and it may
be the case that expert knowledge helps people avoid substantive flip-flops. See Dan M. Kahan et
al., ‘‘Ideology ” or “Situation Sense ’’? An Experimental Investigation o f Motivated Reasoning and
Professional Judgment, 164 U. P a . L. R ev . (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2590054## [http://perma.cc/C29P-T5JA] (finding that legal professionals avoid
motivated reasoning when engaging in legal analysis). There is accordingly reason to think that
judges and perhaps politicians who flip-flop do so for reasons discussed below.

510

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 94:485

substantive commitments.118 What links the party findings with merits bias
is a similar blindness, on the part of agents, to the source of their own
judgments.
4. Substantive Flip-Flopping vs. Institutional Flip-Flopping.—We
might call someone a “substantive flip-flopper” if, for example, she believes
that the death penalty is just if and only if the party leadership believes that
the death penalty is just—and if she flips when and because party leadership
does so. A naive institutional flip-flopper believes (or says) that the filibuster
is legitimate if and only if the party leadership believes (or says) that it is
legitimate; or, possibly, if and only if the filibuster advances the implementa
tion of her substantive views in particular cases. (For example, such a flipflopper might generally believe that the Senate should defer to the President’s
choice of Executive Branch nominees, but might flip because of her strong
views on civil rights.) The latter case can produce flip-flopping that exceeds
the pace of change in leadership. The naive institutional flip-flopper might
support the filibuster today because it blocks a judicial nominee of whom she
disapproves, and then oppose the filibuster tomorrow because it blocks a new
healthcare bill that she likes.
We suspect that naive institutional flip-flopping is more common than
naive substantive flip-flopping. At least on the very largest issues, people’s
substantive views are not highly malleable, and on such issues, they may well
be impervious even to reports about the views of party leadership.119 Most
people who oppose the death penalty will continue to oppose it even if the
party changes its mind.120 By contrast, institutional values are far less robust,
because they do not trigger immediate or strongly held reactions in the
abstract, tend to be derivative of substantive views, and often depend on
complex tradeoffs.
Of course it is true that some flip-flops are palpable inconsistencies and
might produce a significant degree of embarrassment in the agent (who might
have to offer an explanation in terms of learning). But sometimes the
embarrassment is tolerable (for reasons explained below121) and sometimes
it is avoidable. In our example above, the flip-flopper might be able to reason

118. It is possible that the results in our first two surveys are influenced by the party heuristic.
But in the third survey, there is no mention of the party’s position.
119. One of the present authors (Sunstein) is engaged in empirical research (with Todd Rogers
and Edward Glaeser) that supports this claim.
120. The theory of “cultural cognition” explains how one’s political beliefs on issues such as
the death penalty and environmental protection are derived from one’s cultural worldview, which
precedes party affiliation. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy,
24 Y ale L. & Po l ’y Rev . 149, 150 (2006).
121. See infra section 11(B)(2) (discussing flip-flops from a cost-benefit perspective).
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to herself that different values are at stake in the case of nominations and
statutes, and so her changing position about the filibuster is not really
inconsistent.
B.

Tactical Flip-Flops

1. Definition.—A tactical flip-flop takes place when an agent knowingly
(as opposed to naively) changes institutional positions in order to gain a
tactical advantage. Merits bias is not involved. Tactical flip-flops may be
cynical; institutional arguments might be invoked for purely strategic or
opportunistic reasons. The agent recognizes that her credibility may suffer
but believes that the tactical gain outweighs any long-term loss. She might
believe that people’s memories are short and hence that she has little to lose
from the flip-flop. Or she might believe that the relevant audience consists
mainly of naive flip-floppers who will not believe that the agent’s flip-flop is
tactical.
Use of institutional arguments can be good strategy. It is clear that if an
agent invokes an institutional or legal position that is independent of the
merits, she might be able to obtain agreement from people who fiercely
disagree with her on matters of substance or politics. For example, a lawyer
might persuade judges, or a judge might persuade colleagues, to vote to
uphold an agency’s interpretation of the Affordable Care Act under the
Chevron principle122—and thus bracket disagreements that might break out
in the absence of that principle.123 The problem is that if an institutional
position is held only for tactical reasons, there is a pervasive risk of flipflopping and hence a loss of credibility.
2. Politics.—Tactical flip-flops are ubiquitous in politics. Recall that
when Republicans hold a majority of the seats in the Senate, many of them
decry the use of the filibuster by the Democratic minority, claiming that it is
antidemocratic;124 but when Republicans are in the minority, many of them
claim that the filibuster is sanctioned by the Senate’s traditions.125 Many
Democrats make exactly the same arguments according to their position as

122. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-^15 (1984).
123. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 373-76 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015) (applying Chevron deference to the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation of the
Affordable Care Act).
124. See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 1 (describing consideration given by Republican Senators in
2005 to a vote to “eliminate Democratic filibusters against [Republican President George W.
Bush’s] choices for the federal bench”).
125. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 2 (reporting that in 2015, Republican Senator Mitch
McConnell accused Senate Democrats of “trying to do irreversible damage to an institution that in
many ways still functions as it did when the Constitution was drafted” when Senate Democrats
proposed a rule requiring fewer votes to confirm federal judges).
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majority or minority party.126 We have given other examples of this phenom
enon—recess appointments, court packing, signing statements, unilateral
executive action, and so on. In some such cases, flip-flopping is naive, but
in others, it is tactical. While legislators self-consciously invoke institutional
considerations, they do so opportunistically, seeking to enlist some
apparently principled argument (about checks and balances or the need to
break a logjam) in the interest of a substantive goal, which is all that they
really care about.127
Some tactical flip-flops are in a sense shameless, but others are more
subtle. Suppose that a leader of a political party wants to attack a policy
initiative from the president who is from the opposing party. Suppose too
that the substantive issue (immigration, relations with Cuba, same-sex
marriage, climate change) is one on which the leader’s own party is divided.
The leader might press an institutional claim in the hope of building a large
coalition. Some members might be far more willing to agree that “the
president has exceeded his authority” than that “the president’s policy
preferences are objectionable.” To be sure, such members would be, in the
circumstances, immune from merits bias. But we could easily imagine
circumstances in which a party leader attempts to enlist people who are
willing to press a claim about institutional overreaching alongside those who
object to the president’s action on the merits.
Tactical flip-flops are easy to understand, certainly within the political
domain. (We will see that the judicial context is more complex.) Consider
an analogy.128 If a lawyer argues for one position on Monday, and for another
position on Tuesday, there need be no problem, at least if the lawyer has
different clients. In an adversary system, lawyers are entitled to defend their
clients vigorously, and there is no requirement of consistency across clients.
Perhaps elected officials can be viewed in similar terms. Their job is to de
fend their constituents, and it is not a problem if the rhetorical resources they
deploy in one year are very different from those they deploy five years later.

126. See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 1 (quoting Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer, who accused
Senate Republicans o f “trying to undermine the age-old checks and balances that the founding
fathers placed at the center o f the Constitution and the Republic” when Republicans tried to block
Democratic filibusters in 2005).
127. See, e.g., Erica Werner, Democrats Clinch Critical Votes fo r Iran Nuclear Deal,
ASSOCIATED
press
(Sept.
8,
2015,
10:29
PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
49a2f41e0fe4432bbfa4afbde3f2fca8/congress-plunging-debate-iran-nuclear-deal [http://perma.cc/
6S9X-HW8R] (relating both Republican Senator Mitch McConnell’s claim that “the Senate should
not hide behind procedural obfuscation to shield the president or our individual views” by
filibustering a resolution disapproving o f the Iran nuclear accord and Democratic Senator Chris
Murphy’s assertion that “[i]f we have to go through the procedural charade of a veto, and a vote to
sustain the veto, it will be embarrassing for this administration and this country” such that a filibuster
of the resolution is better for American credibility around the world).
128. Thanks to David Strauss for raising it.
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In any case, the overriding concern of individual legislators is to be
reelected, 129 and the goal of each party is to control the government. 130 If
legislators want to be reelected, it might well be in their interest to reject the
initiatives of a president of an opposing party, lest they be accused of
capitulation (and render themselves vulnerable to a primary challenge). At
the same time, legislators face a number of pressures, electoral and otherwise,
to support the initiatives of a president of the same party. It is true that the
electoral self-interest of individual legislators will sometimes lead them to
support a president of the opposing party or to oppose a president of the same
party, but the general tendency is clear. A Republican member of the House
of Representatives in a majority Republican district is unlikely to have much
to gain by supporting a Democratic president and might have something to
lose.
Some members of Congress are partisans, either by choice or because
of the influence exerted by party leadership. To a greater or lesser degree,
they want to maximize the authority of their own party. To partisans, of
course, the ideal world is one in which their party exercises full control when
it holds the majority and can block the other party’s attempt to govern when
it does not hold the majority. Thus, partisans routinely advance generous
interpretations of institutional constraints when out of power and narrow
interpretations when in power.
Suppose, for example, that a president makes a series of recess appoint
ments in circumstances in which people reasonably dispute the question of
whether he has the legal authority to do so. Most people are unlikely to have
clear views on the underlying question. The underlying issues are highly
technical, and without a great deal of work, it is not easy to end up with a
firm conviction. To be sure, dedicated guardians of legislative power, taken
as such, might be expected to insist on the importance of advice and consent;
they might have an institutional conviction that outruns short-run considera
tions about whether a particular president is likely to be able to ensure that
his preferred people are in place. And it is possible to identify some legisla
tors who have had some convictions. 131 But in light of the standard incentives

129. D avid r . M ayhew , Congress : T he Electoral C onnection 16 (1974).
130. See Gary W. Cox & MATHEW D. McCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE
Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives 32-33 (2005) (describing how
legislative majorities exercise political control by controlling the legislative agenda).
131. See Adam Clymer, Robert C. Byrd, a Pillar o f the Senate, Dies at 92, N. Y. TIMES (June 28,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/us/politics/29byrd.html [http://perma.cc/BP7F-J6B7]
(describing Senator Robert Byrd as a committed “champion o f the legislative branch” who opposed
both Congress’s granting of line-item-veto power to the President and the invasion o f Iraq without
congressional declaration of war because he believed both to be contrary to the government structure
established by the Constitution).
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faced by those who run for public office, and who seek to keep their jobs, it
is highly unusual to emphasize, and to stand by, such convictions. For this
reason, tactical flip-flopping is not exactly surprising.
From another perspective, however, tactical flip-flops are also puzzling.
The flip-flops are so common that one might wonder why anyone ever
believes these institutional arguments—and if no one believes them, why
politicians would ever bother to make them. One possible explanation is that
no one believes them; it is all theater or “cheap talk,”132 similar to polite
conversation. But there is another possibility, which is that many people
(including many voters) have short memories, and the sheer plausibility of
an institutional argument, on the merits, can ensure that it is not entirely
ineffective.
If Republican legislators decry the imperial presidency during a
Democratic administration, and if their objections have apparent force, it
might not much matter that they defended (similar) presidential authority
under a Republican administration. And even if no one is actually persuaded
by their objections, at least they might have the functions of intensifying the
commitment of the like-minded and appealing to the beliefs of constituents.
Linder these circumstances, it might well be in the interest of many legislators
to flip at Time 1 and to flop at Time 2. From the standpoint of individual
agents, the benefits of both actions exceed their costs. The benefits of the
initial flip are clear, and the costs of the flop might be small or even zero.
At the same time, it is reasonable to suppose that institutional arguments
sometimes do exert some force— but usually not a large amount—at least
when the underlying questions are genuinely difficult. Senators from both
parties, for example, jointly benefit from common institutional rules that
protect political minorities. A current majority is aware that if it adopts rules
that greatly weaken the authority of the current minority, it might itself be
disempowered in the future. And legislators of both sides are likely to have
some respect for the traditional institutional prerogatives of the national
legislature, thus ensuring that it will preserve a “core” of those prerogatives.
“Turf protection” can sometimes unite legislators across partisan lines,
reducing flip-flops.
It is a nice question how a degree of institutional self-protection interacts
with the electoral concerns of individual legislators; we could easily imagine
and even find cases in which electoral self-interest argued in favor of little
interest in institutional questions, even within the “core.” (Imagine cases of
recent attacks on the United States, where broad delegation to the executive

132. In game theory, “cheap talk” refers to communication among players with no direct cost
in the game. See Vincent Crawford, A Survey o f Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,
78 J. ECON. THEORY 286, 286 (1998) (“‘[T]alk is cheap’ in the sense that players’ messages have
no direct payoff implications . . . . ”).
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might be what voters want.) But some common understandings provide a
degree of constraint and thus can be meaningfully invoked in debate, even if
they exert influence only on the margin.
3. Courts.—Clear tactical flip-flops are much less visible in the courts
than in the political arena, but the concept is not unfamiliar in discussions of
the judiciary, and tactical flip-flops can sometimes be found within the legal
system. To take an admittedly extreme allegation, begin with Bush v. Gore,
where some people flatly accuse the majority of ruling for Bush in order to
ensure that the next several appointments to the Supreme Court would be
Republicans.133 On this view, the Republican Justices who voted for Bush
feared becoming a minority as a result of Gore appointments over the next
four to eight years, and thus losing their power to shape American law.134
The Justices were willing to lose some credibility, to adopt an adventurous
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, or relax their commitment to
federalism in order to ensure that they had enough power in order to advance
their legal and ideological goals another day.135
We do not mean to endorse this set of claims, which we think unfair,
accusatory, and wrong. But we suspect that within the federal judiciary,
tactical flip-flops are much more common than generally recognized, albeit
less dramatic (and far more interesting) than the alleged tactical flip-flop in
Bush v. Gore. One likely reason that Justices are unable to make fully
consistent institutional arguments in all opinions that they join is that it is
necessary to form majorities with Justices who may agree on the outcome but
disagree with the reasoning. A Justice who does not have a weak commit
ment to federalism, or who is unenthusiastic about originalism, might be
willing to join an opinion that shows a strong commitment to federalism, or
a keen interest in originalism, as a way of preventing undue splintering within
the Court.136 It is common forjudges or justices to join opinions with which
they do not wholly agree,137 and the result can be a degree of institutional
flip-flopping from one case to another.

133. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110

Yale L.J. 1407, 1409 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court because “[b]y intervening in the
election, the five conservatives installed a President who would appoint their colleagues and
successors and would stock the federal judiciary with like-minded conservatives”).
134. See id. (criticizing the conservative Justices in Bush v. Gore as “appearing] to use the
power of judicial review to secure control o f another branch of government that would, in turn, help
keep their constitutional revolution going”).
135. See id. at 1426 (labeling the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection argument in Bush v. Gore
as “a large stretch in the doctrine”).
136. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (in which Justice
Kennedy joined Justice Scalia’s highly originalist majority opinion stating that “[t]he 18th-century
meaning [of ‘arms’] is no different from the meaning today”).
137. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (in which
Justice Kagan joined the part o f Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion holding that “ [a]s for the Medicaid
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Judicial opinions often reflect incompletely theorized agreements, in the
form of low-level principles on which diverse people can agree
notwithstanding their disagreement on fundamental issues.1 When incom
pletely theorized agreements are in place, there will be no flip-flopping. But
sometimes incomplete theorization is not possible, perhaps because it is
insufficient to resolve the relevant controversy, perhaps because some
members of the winning coalition want to offer some reasoning with which
other members do not fully agree. In such cases, the opinion might not fully
reflect the views of all those who join it, and a degree of flip-flopping will
eventually follow.
For example, suppose that in Windsor, Justice X believed that DOMA
was unconstitutional at least in part on federalism grounds while Justice Y
believed that DOMA was unconstitutional entirely on Equal Protection
grounds (and hence that federalism was irrelevant). Perhaps Justice X was
assigned the opinion, and Justice Y wished to avoid writing a concurrence
because she did not want to complicate the law, or increase uncertainty, and
perhaps also feared that X might flip his vote (or perhaps would similarly
refuse to join X s opinions in future cases). Accordingly, Justice Y joins an
opinion whose reasoning may be inconsistent with another opinion written
by Justice Y, resulting in what appears to be a flip-flop and indeed is a tactical
flip-flop. Justice Y suppresses her reasoning and takes a possible hit to her
reputation in order to preserve stability and comity within the Court and her
relationship with Justice X (enabling Justice Y to exert greater influence on
the law in some future case). If so, Justice Y will engage in tactical flipflopping, in the sense that she has committed herself to a view with which
she does not fully agree and from which she will retreat in time.
C.

Non-Flip-Flops

Many cases of alleged or apparent flip-flopping are nothing of the kind.
Charges of flip-flopping—like charges of hypocrisy more generally—often
disintegrate once we specify the beliefs of the relevant agent. The problem
with the charges is that they may depend on taking those beliefs at a high
(and obtuse) level of abstraction, when those who hold them do not take them
in that way.
Suppose, for example, that a judge is charged with flip-flopping if she
favors invalidation of affirmative action programs but has no objection to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, or if she is willing to uphold

expansion, that portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the Constitution by threatening existing
Medicaid funding”).
138. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995) (asserting that judges “try to produce incompletely theorized
agreements on particular outcomes. They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level
explanations for it.” (emphasis omitted)).
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gun-control legislation but is unwilling to uphold restrictions on commercial
advertising. At a certain level of abstraction (“Does the judge believe in
judicial activism?”), such a judge might be accused of flip-flopping, but the
charge might well be baseless in light of the theory of interpretation that the
judge actually holds.
A judge who believes that the Equal Protection Clause requires racial
neutrality, and no more, is hardly inconsistent if she votes to invalidate
affirmative action programs but to allow discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. A judge who votes to strike down an agency interpretation of
law on the ground that it violates the text of the underlying statute is not
inconsistent if he later votes to uphold an agency interpretation on the ground
that it does not run afoul of any statutory text. We suspect that within the
court system, accusations of flip-flopping are frequently and perhaps
generally misplaced, because they fail to specify the theory under which the
accused judges are operating.
Indeed, it is quite clear that in the contexts of substantive due process
and federalism, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy can raise
plausible defenses against flip-flop accusations, certainly if the decisions
discussed above are treated in isolation. More broadly, and apart from
theories of inteipretation, there are two basic responses to a flip-flop
accusation that fall well within the conventions of legal reasoning.
1. Weighting.—An the context of substantive due process, Justice
Kennedy could argue that in both Casey and Lawrence he took seriously the
principle of stare decisis, but the principle had more weight in Casey than in
Lawrence. In Casey after all, the precedent, Roe v. Wade, was almost twenty
years old.1,9 Countless judicial opinions had relied on it, as had many state
legislatures.140 Private actors had as well by, for example, moving their
households to conservative states or setting up abortion clinics in those
states.141 Politicians had built their careers defending or criticizing Roe,
suggesting that the Court’s decision had supplied a settled background for a
longstanding public debate.142 In Lawrence, the precedent (Bowers v.

139. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U S 113
(1973).
140. See. e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1976) (noting
that “[t)his case is a logical and anticipated corollary to Roe v. Wade").
141. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (“[F]or two decades o f economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define them views of themselves
and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception
should fail.”); History o f Planned Parenthood o f the Heartland, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-heartland/who-we-are/history
[https://perma.cc/4XXK-R7Z4] (including examples of clinics opened by Planned Parenthood after
Roe v. Wade).
142. To be sure, it is not clear that this point argues strongly in favor of respecting a contested
precedent.
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Hardwick) was nearly as old, but states generally did not enforce their
antisodomy laws, and it is therefore hard to believe that anyone relied on the
holding in Bowers.143 On this ground, Justice Kennedy was justified in giving
relatively little weight to Bowers, while giving much weight to Roe. No one
believes that stare decisis is absolute.144 Sometimes the arguments on its
behalf are very strong, and sometimes they are weak.145 It is certainly argu
able that the claims for stare decisis were stronger in Casey than in Lawrence.
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist could argue that federalism concerns
in Bush v. Gore were far less weighty than the federalism concerns in
Gregory.146 On one view, Florida’s local law and its (arguably questionable)
local judiciary made decisions that would have significant national import.
In Bush v. Gore, it was contended that the Equal Protection Clause called for
a principle of equality in national elections that was not being respected by
Florida officials.147 Retirement ages for state employees, by contrast, really
are local in nature, and so federal legislation that attempts to control them
runs afoul of weighty federalism concerns. Whether or not this line of
argument is ultimately convincing, it is certainly plausible to say that
federalism concerns deserve different weights in different contexts— and
hence that no flip-flop is involved.
2. Omitted Institutional Values.—One institutional value must be
weighed against others, and so even if the value about which a court allegedly
flip-flops is equally weighty in two cases, the outcomes would still not
necessarily be the same. Suppose, for example, that Justice Kennedy
believed that gays and lesbians were a politically vulnerable group, one that
on the logic of Carolene Products148 was entitled to a special level of judicial

143. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see
Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Law Banning Sodomy, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/politics/26WIRE-SODO.html [http://perma.cc/X697-GC6Q]
(noting that sodomy laws “on the books are rarely enforced”).
144. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers o f
Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1766-75 (2013) (describing how ambiguity impacts
whether stare decisis imposes binding law on future courts); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the
Rule o f Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012) (“[S]tare decisis is not an
absolute, and even in a system of precedent, earlier decisions can be revisited.”).
145. See Waldron, supra note 144, at 9,21-26 (explaining that stare decisis supports “certainty,
predictability, and respect for established expectations,” but that application of these principles is
flawed).
146. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
147. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-08 (2000).
148. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that
legislation involving discrete and insular minorities may call for a more searching judicial inquiry).
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protection because its members could not defend themselves in the political
arena.144 This institutional factor could cut against stare decisis.
As for Bush v. Gore, it is possible to speculate that the Supreme Court
intervened in order to prevent partisan Florida judges from throwing the
election for Gore.150 If that was a motivation for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
vote, he may well have believed that one institutional value—preserving free
and fair elections at the national level— superseded the values of federalism
that controlled the outcome in cases that did not involve national presidential
elections.
The weighting and omitted-values arguments are potentially available
to the Justices to avoid the flip-flop charge, but they are not necessarily valid.
Some people may agree that the weight that should be given to Roe is greater
than the weight that should be given to Bowers', others may disagree. To
resolve this disagreement, one must investigate further the underlying theory
of precedent. A very simple theory—older precedents are given more
weight— could genuinely constrain flip-flopping. Others— for example,
better-reasoned precedents are given more weight—might themselves be too
spongy to prevent flip-flopping. Similarly, there must be a boundary on the
type of institutional values that Justices might invoke to rationalize their
decisions. We might be more willing to accept weighting and omitted-values
arguments when Justices candidly make those arguments, but they do not
always do so— indeed, they did not in Lawrence and Bush.
D.

Bayesian Updating

Agents sometimes change their minds about institutional values. When
they do so, their decisions may appear to be a flip-flop. But whatever one
calls their decisions, the negative connotation of the word “flip-flop” does
not seem fair. The change in positions is not naive; no merits bias and no
motivated reasoning need be involved. Nor is it tactical or opportunistic; the
agent is being sincere. But the change in position is genuine, in the sense that
at Time 2 the agent invokes a value that she repudiated at Time 1. There is
no hypocrisy here, no naivete, and nothing tactical. The agent has changed
her mind.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical proponent of executive power
who has consistently argued in favor of broad executive authority in general
and in such specific manifestations as signing statements, unilateral war

149. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman,BeyondCarolene Products, 98 HARV. L. R ev. 713, 718-22 (1985)
(using hypothetical scenarios to discuss the doctrinal implications of the “discrete and insular
minorities” exception in Carolene Products).
150. For an identification but not endorsement of this view, see David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore;
What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. Rev . 737, 756 (2001), which rejects the contention that
the United States Supreme Court suspected the Florida Supreme Court of a nakedly partisan effort
to steal the election.
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making, the line-item veto, and so on. Her beliefs are based on her study of
history; perhaps she believes that time and again the executive saved the day,
while feckless legislatures and courts tried to hold it back. One day, this
proponent realizes that her institutional assumptions were wrong. The
executive is actually more dangerous than the other institutions and cannot
be trusted. She now opposes signing statements, unilateral war making, and
the line-item veto.
Or consider a person, living in the 1920s and 1930s, who reveres the
Supreme Court and the rest of the federal judicial system, seeing it as the
great bulwark against political corruption or tyrannical majorities. But as the
Court repeatedly blocks much-needed social legislation, she begins to think
that it is a reactionary institution that holds the nation back. By 1937, she is
willing to support FDR’s court-packing plan, having repudiated institutional
values that would have caused her ten years earlier to oppose it. She adopts
an approach associated with James Bradley Thayer, arguing in favor of a
strong presumption of constitutionality, which she once believed to be
indefensible and absurd.151 She thinks that her new view reflects hard-won
wisdom.
We could imagine a similar reversal in more recent decades. Suppose
that in the 1960s, observers (and perhaps judges as well) supported an
aggressive role for the federal judiciary, seeing courts as indispensable
safeguards for politically weak groups.132 Perhaps the Warren Court seemed
to be a desirable model. Perhaps the Supreme Court appeared to be “the
forum of principle” in American government.151 But suppose that in the last
decades, people who were once inclined to this view have become
disaffected, not on the ground that the Warren Court was wrong but because
of a belief that it represented an unusual, and perhaps unique, period in
American history. Perhaps they believe that the Court cannot protect
politically weak groups, because it is unwilling to do so. Perhaps such people
now think that the Court cannot be the forum of principle, because it is not
good at moral theorizing. Good Bayesians could reject their previous
position on the ground that the Justices are likely to use judicial power in
ways that they would reject—and that a restrained judicial position is
therefore better.
Perhaps they end up embracing some version of
Thayerism.154

151. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope o f the American Doctrine o f Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 143-^14 (1893) (arguing that courts ought to strike down a law only if
its unconstitutionality is “so dear that it is not open to rational question”).
152. See Ely, supra note 9, at 108 (“[I]t wasn’t until we were well into the 1960s (and out of
the spell of McCarthyism) that our national self-confidence returned to the point where the Court
could be counted on to invalidate legislation making criminals of Communists.”).
153. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum o f Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516 (1981).
154. See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 270 (2006) (justifying Thayerism by suggesting that under conditions
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Alternatively, we could imagine people—once frustrated, and even
appalled by the approach of the Warren Court and insistent on a restrained
judicial role—changing their view in light of the possibility of originalist
judging or firm judicial protection of liberty as they understand it. Those
who reject progressive constitutional law, of the sort exercised by the Warren
Court, might flip from an embrace of Thayerism to strong support for judicial
restraint on the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause or on what
might be considered to be takings of private property.
Of course, such people could not be fairly accused of an institutional
flip-flop if they held the same view all along. But if they shift from
Thayerism to some other approach, they are engaged in an institutional flipflop—not for tactical reasons, but because they have learned over time. In
fact, we can easily imagine numerous shifts, at least over a sufficient period
of time. People with a particular set of substantive views who favor an
institutional position at Time 1 might flip at Time 2 and flip back at Time 3,
only to flip again at Time 4, all because of what they learn at relevant periods.
It is possible to accuse people who engage in such shifts of massive flipflopping across numerous policy areas. But in the cases we have described,
the agent will argue that the term is not appropriate because of its negative
connotations. She has legitimately changed her mind. Open-mindedness is
a virtue, and it is both important and honorable to learn over time. Still, it is
not clear that this type of global flip-flop is always, or necessarily, less
troublesome than the policy-specific flip-flop. We might be less inclined to
trust someone who could be so wrong (by her own lights) for so long.
In any event, we call this type of flip-flop “Bayesian updating” in order
to acknowledge that people will rationally update their beliefs about
institutional values as they obtain more information about how institutions
work and of what they achieve. As they do so, they may change their beliefs
about the desirability of specific policy outcomes that are grounded in
specific institutional values. A person might think that signing statements
are good until she loses trust in the executive as an institution and then
rationally believe that signing statements are bad. A person might think that

of severe uncertainty and bounded rationality, judges should limit themselves to enforcing clear and
specific coordinating texts); J. H a r v ie WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: W h y
A m e r ic a n s A r e L o s in g T h e ir In a l ie n a b l e R ig h t s t o S e l f -G o v e r n a n c e 25-26, 122 n.64
(2012) (“The final reason that it is preferable to have the legislature be the one to update is that
judicial updating can strangle democratic vigor. One foundational premise o f the American
experiment is that self-determination is a valuable good. Popular participation in government
creates a whole host of benefits that arise ‘from the vigorous thinking that ha[s] to be done in the
political debates . . . , from the infiltration through every part of the population o f sound ideas and
sentiments, from the rousing into activity o f opposite elements, the enlargement o f ideas, the
strengthening of moral fibre, and the growth of political experience.’ Indeed, even when the fruits
o f that participation are flawed, there is often great value in ‘the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901))).
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an aggressive judicial role is good until she loses trust in the capacities of the
judges and then rationally believe that an aggressive judicial role is bad.
Recall that institutional positions require some kind of substantive
justification, at least over the long term, and reduced levels of trust certainly
bear on substantive justifications.
In some contexts, of course, serious questions might be raised about the
legitimacy of Bayesian learning. Suppose that the right theory of constitu
tional interpretation is originalist, and suppose that that theory leads to a
particular set of conclusions about certain issues involving executive power,
voting rights, and the Commerce Clause. If so, any flip-flopping, from one
era to another, would be illegitimate—the agent’s role is to follow the origi
nal understanding. If the agent has learned something about the capacities
and propensities of judges, she ought not to flip. She ought to continue to
follow the original understanding. The general point is that with respect to
institutional matters, Bayesian learning would be legitimate only if what
people are learning is legitimately relevant to their decisions.
In the context of executive-legislative relations, some of the underlying
questions do not involve constitutional law; they involve issues of policy.
And it is possible to think that judgments about constitutional law, or even
interpretation as such, depend, in the end, on assessments of consequences,
so that understandings about institutional performance and the capacities of
judges and legislatures really should inform one’s choice of interpretative
theory.155 If so, institutional flip-flops may in fact reflect a form of
permissible updating on the basis of new information. For those who believe
(as we do) that an approach to interpretation cannot possibly be blind to
consequences, it is not objectionable for someone to shift in the direction of
Thayerism when new information supports Thayerism, or to shift away from
Thayerism for the same reason. Tactical flip-flopping would not be
admirable within the judiciary (putting to one side the practical issues faced
by multimember courts), but nothing is wrong with learning from experience.
Judges have on occasion changed their views about legal doctrine as a
result of what they saw as learning.156 For example, Justice Blackmun
reversed his stance on the death penalty after voting to uphold it for many
years. In an earlier case, he wrote that the wisdom of the death penalty was
for legislatures to determine and joined another opinion arguing that it was
possible for courts to ensure that racism and other invidious factors did not
influence capital punishment decisions.157 Many years later, he argued that
155. See VERMEULE, supra note 153, at 231 (asserting that ambitious judicial review creates
interpretive regimes stretching beyond the particular results envisioned at a systemic cost to our
legal order).
156. See Justin Driver, Judicial Inconsistency as Virtue: The Case o f Justice Stevens, 99 Geo .
L.J. 1263, 1274-77 (2011) (collecting examples of Justices who have changed their minds).
157. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410-11 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 44850 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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experience had taught that legislatures could not create rules that ensured that
the death penalty could be administered fairly, and thus it was
unconstitutional. 158 It was the experience of the intervening years that caused
him to change his mind—and he appeared to change his mind about
institutional values or capacities (the capacity of legislatures to ensure that
capital punishment is administered fairly) rather than about the policy itself.
Some people, particularly intellectuals, seem to undergo conversion
experiences. They resist the accumulating evidence until it becomes
irresistible and then repudiate their old views in one great burst of anguish. 1''9
Government officials, politicians, and judges seem to change their views
more gradually . 160 It is frequently noted that Supreme Court Justices “drift”
over time, becoming more liberal or more conservative. 161 This may reflect
Bayesian updating. A more concrete example is the claim that Republican
Supreme Court Justices lost trust in the Executive Branch and began turning
against the Bush administration in the war-on-terror cases after disclosures
of executive-branch-ordered torture of suspected terrorists. 162 In that context,
there is a plausible argument about judicial learning.
III. Beyond Flip-Flops? A Way Forward
Flip-flopping is so common that it has generated its own metadiscourse,
in which journalists, politicians, academics, and judges not only disagree on
the substance but also accuse each other of institutional flip-flopping. 163

158. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., Andy McSmith, From Left to Right: On the Mid-Life Political Conversions,
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/p9olitics/from-left-toright-on-the-midlife-political-conversions-796267.html [http://perma.ee/E98F-FU2X] (discussing
examples of midlife conversions).
160. There are also interesting questions about academic flip-flops, both in general (as, for
example, when teachers o f constitutional law change their minds on certain issues, perhaps for
narrowly partisan reasons, perhaps as a result of learning) and in the context of public service (as,
for example, when academics depart significantly from their previous views while serving in
government, or shift, as academics, away from views that they held while working for government).
We do not engage those complex issues here.
161. See, e.g.. Driver, supra note 155, at 1276 (suggesting that Justices should not shy away
from providing an explanation for their reversals because reversals o f preceding Justices have been
commended as refusals to allow prior thinking to prevail); Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1486
(2007) (announcing that practically every Justice who has served since the 1930s has drifted to the
left or right or switched directions several times).
162. Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens, N e w YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2010/03/22/after-stevens [http://perma.cc/UUQ9-K9AV] (noting Republican
appointee Justice Stevens’s repudiation of the Bush Administration’s legal approach to the War on
Terror and his assignment o f the Boumediene v. Bush opinion to Justice Kennedy, another
Republican appointee).
163. See, e.g., Maggie Koerth-Baker, The Mind o f a Flip-Flopper, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/magazine/the-mind-of-a-flip-flopper.html
[http://perma.cc/GH6F-TE73] (examining why people “flip-flop” and quoting one researcher as
stating that political discourse leads us to “accuse our opponents of bad faith and ulterior motives”);
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These responses generally amount to little more than “gotcha!” with implicit
accusations of hypocrisy and bad faith.164 As noted, many of these
allegations are unjustified. We think that there are more productive ways to
approach this debate, though they raise problems of their own.
A.

Identifying the Problem

Flip-flopping is not inevitable. Indeed, from one perspective, it is
surprisingly rare. Imagine that President Bush had announced in 2008 that
because of the War on Terror, a state of emergency existed that (1) allowed
him to stay in office beyond the end of his term; or (2) entitled him to stand
for election to a third term; or (3) allowed him to jail political opponents who
undermined the war effort by criticizing his policies. We are confident that
if President Bush had made any of these claims, Republicans as well as
Democrats would have opposed him, just as Democrats (and Republicans)
would object if the president who made such claims were a Democrat. In this
context, we think it plain that the parties would not flip-flop—that they would
oppose such actions regardless of whether they were taken by a copartisan or
a member of the opposite party. In the face of clear constitutional norms, we
do not expect to see flip-flopping.
Flip-flopping also is surprisingly rare for a range of longstanding norms
that lack a constitutional foundation. It is an established practice for the
majority party in the Flouse or Senate to permit members of the minority party
to sit on committees and question witnesses.165 We think, again, that if a
leader of the majority party proposed depriving members of the minority
party of their traditional seats, that leader would be opposed by copartisans
as well as by members of the opposite party. Here again there is no flipping
or flopping.
A key precondition of flip-flopping thus seems to be ambiguity as to
whether a constitutional or institutional norm exists. Consider whether a
norm exists that permits filibusters of presidential nominees to Executive

Linton Weeks, Summertime Politics: Bring Out the Flip-Flops, NPR (Aug. 15, 2011, 1:26 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/05/139019758/summertirae-politics-bring-out-the-flip-flops
[http://perma.cc/AL3W-28MJ] (detailing flip-flopping charges brought out by the national debt
crisis).
164. See Koerth-Baker, supra note 162 (recognizing that “calling someone a flip-flopper is a
way of calling them morally suspect. . . [and] unfaithful,” even though it is common for people to
change their minds); Dana Milbank, Opinion, Dana Milbank: Republicans Flip-flop on 'Judicial
Activism,' WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbankrepublicans-flip-flop-on-judicial-activism/2014/02/26/39754c5c-9f38-l Ie3-9ba6-800dl 192d08b
_story.html [https://perma.cc/MY5E-75ME] (presenting examples of politicians accusing others of
flip-flopping).
165. See Tim Groseclose & David C. King, Committee Theories Reconsidered, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 191, 205 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001)
(mentioning the unwritten practice of including minority party members on congressional
committees).
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Branch offices. There is no consensus that the norm exists—or that it does
not exist. 166 Disagreement prevails. In this setting, it may not be surprising
that politicians flip-flop. The problems with a norm permitting filibusters
may be obvious when one’s party holds the Presidency and much less so
when the other party holds the Presidency. Since disagreement exists as to
the existence and value of the norm, people may genuinely come to see costs
or benefits that they previously overlooked when a different party held
control of the relevant institution.
We explore below the extent to which the problem of flip-flopping
results from a failure of enforcement (the topic of supart D, below). What
we are emphasizing here is that at least in the United States, flip-flopping is
a product of ambiguity, at least in the sense that ambiguity is a necessary,
whether or not sufficient, condition. The ambiguity concerns the existence
and contours of a purported norm, that is, the extent to which a norm has
really been followed or not. For example, there is a long history of
filibustering; what is relatively new is the filibustering of Executive Branch
nominees (or perhaps the filibustering of a large number of such nominees as
opposed to isolated outliers). It may be unclear whether the norm that
permitted filibustering of bills extended to Executive Branch nominees or
not. Or, to consider another example, the principle of federalism dictates that
state governments legislate with respect to local matters, but it is often
ambiguous what counts as a local matter and what does not.
In the face of such ambiguity, merits bias is likely to have a great deal
of influence. The same is true of tactical changes of position to gain political
advantage. It is in the face of ambiguity—rather than clearly established
lines—that learning can produce shifts in institutional commitments. And
yet, at the same time, norms do come and go, 167 and so it is possible that what
once was clear can become ambiguous and vice versa.
B.

Optimal Institutional Design

Flip-flopping, then, is connected to the problem of evaluating
ambiguous rules of institutional design (including both constitutional and
“sub-constitutional” or institutional rules or norms) in the “midst” of normal
politics. Parties recognize that some rules define the “game” of political
conflict; those rules must be applied impartially to both parties. That is why
everyone agrees that the Twenty-Second Amendment applies to Republican
and Democratic presidents alike. 168 But, as noted, many rules are ambiguous
166. See Developments in the Law — Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. R ev . 2057, 2147—
49 (2012) (discussing the uncertain norms surrounding the use o f filibusters to control executive
appointments).
167. Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Revision o f Norms, 100 ETHICS 756, 756 (1990) (explaining that
norms “emerge, endure, [and] pass away”).
168. See Daniel Friedman & Donald Wittman, Term Limits as Political Redistribution, in
Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives 229,230 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1996)
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(including filibustering rules); it is also possible that everyone would
recognize the value of new rules. Indeed, new rules are being proposed all
the time.
Consider, for example, rules that now govern campaign
contributions (at least the relatively uncontroversial ones) or that require the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to determine the budgetary impact
of proposed laws. The idea behind these rules is that they improve politics,
or benefit the nation as a whole, without giving an advantage to a specific
party; thus, if the rules are implemented, they must be enforced impartially.169
In an ideal world, flip-flopping would be avoided if politicians honestly
evaluated these rules and, with the requisite information and impartiality,
supported those that improved the political system. Evaluation of the rules
would then depend on some kind of social-welfare analysis. For example, a
typical argument for campaign-finance reform is that existing rules allow the
rich to bias political outcomes in their favor and away from the public
interest.170 If so, public-spirited politicians should support reform. Or
consider a narrower justification: Unlimited campaign finance harms both
parties by locking them in an arms race where they spend all their time raising
money and no time governing.171 It also harms donors because their
increased donations are cancelled out by donations on the other side.
Campaign-finance reform that puts limits on donations benefits both parties
without harming anyone.
In a more realistic world, agreement on rules that advance the public
welfare may be stymied by a number of factors. First and most familiarly,
politicians do not necessarily act in the public interest; they are more likely
to act in their own electoral interest. In the standard formulation, members
of Congress try to maximize the chances of reelection.172 Thus, we are more
likely to see agreement on rules that are mutually beneficial for those who
agree to them than on rules that advance the public interest, though to be sure
many rules may do both.

(explaining one perspective of term limits where politicians agree to “limit their ‘weapon’ (long
term incumbency) only if other districts d[o] likewise”).
169. See Nancy Kingsbury, The Government Accountability Office and Congressional Uses o f
Federal Statistics, 631 ANNALS Am . ACAD. Pol. & SOC. SCI. 43, 44-A6 (2010) (noting the GAO’s
independence and nonpartisan nature as a reason for its success and effectiveness).
170. See, e.g., Fred Wertheimer, Legalized Bribery, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 19, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/citizens-united-campaign-flnance-legalizedbribery-102366 [http://perma.cc/2P8A-QWTD] (arguing that the Court’s decision in Citizens
United opened the door for donors to circumvent campaign-contribution limits).
171. See, e.g., Andy Kroll, Retiring Senator: Congress Doesn 't Work Because We Fundraise
Way Too Much, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 28, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
mojo/2013/01/tom-harkin-retire-senator-fundraise-money [http://perma.cc/NSB3-QV7U] (high
lighting concerns of Democratic public officials about how much time is spent raising money
instead of governing).
172. For the classic discussion, see Mayhew, supra note 129, at 16-17, which postulates that
congressmen are single-minded reelection seekers because reelection is a universal goal for office
holders.
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Second, politicians often face a conflict between their short-term
electoral interest and the long-term interest of their parties. For example,
politicians may worry that campaign-finance reform may prevent them from
winning the next election even if they agree that it would help their party, or
even themselves, if they survive that election. Third, and our particular focus
here, a politician may have difficulty, both because of the pervasiveness of
uncertainty and the role of merits bias, figuring out whether a purported rule
that serves her interest when she is in power but harms her when she is out
of power (or vice versa) is in aggregate beneficial or hannful for her political
interests. It is this last factor that may cause flip-flopping.
Similar points can be made about judicial flip-flops. Consider a judge
who strongly opposes abortion but also takes his judicial role seriously and
acknowledges that as the law now stands, abortion rights are protected by the
U.S. Constitution. Nonetheless, faced with a novel controversy—consider,
for example, recent laws that restrict abortions based on purported or real
concerns about women’s health173—the judge may be tempted (perhaps
unconsciously) to allow his beliefs about abortion to influence his decision.
He thus may uphold the laws by citing principles of federalism even though
in another context he strikes down a state law notwithstanding principles of
federalism. The judge flip-flops on federalism, driven by his substantive
beliefs.
C.

The Veil o f Ignorance

1. In General.—A (potential) solution to these problems is the veil of
ignorance. The veil of ignorance was made famous by John Rawls, who used
it to motivate his theory ofjustice.174 Rawls’s veil of ignorance, like the stateof-nature constructs used by earlier political theorists, allowed us to imagine
the ideal constitutional norms that people would choose under conditions of
impartiality.1'" Because people did not know their positions in life, they
would choose norms that advanced the public good or met other criteria of
justice rather than their own self-interest.
The type of veil we have in mind, however, is less ambitious but for our
purposes more familiar and helpful.176 A politician who considers the merits
173. See Andrea D. Friedman, Bad Medicine: Abortion and the Battle Over Who Speaks fo r
Women's Health, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 45, 58-68 (2013) (arguing that recent state laws
that restrict women’s access to abortions have been based on unfounded medical concerns).
174. See JOHN Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (proposing that if people do not
know their situation in society or natural assets, they cannot be in a position to tailor principles to
their advantage, which will lead to the principles that are agreed to being just).
175. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 76-79
(1962) (suggesting that under the veil of ignorance, individuals participating in the constitution
making process would not be able to anticipate what decisions would benefit them, so they would
attempt to devise constitutional norms that benefit the average person).
176. See Adrian Vermeule, Veil o f Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399,
399, 403-04 (2001) (explaining the purpose of the veil of ignorance to inhibit self-interested
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of a norm against filibustering, campaign-finance reform, or a similar
constitutional or institutional reform should ask herself whether she would
support the norm if she did not know whether she was a Republican or
Democrat. The veil of ignorance deprives her of knowledge of her party.
Under the veil, the politician would support the norm or reform if and only if
she believes that it would advance the nation as a whole.
Similarly, the judge in our example above might ask himself what the
principle of federalism implies in a world in which he does not know whether
he supports or opposes abortion, or indeed any of his political positions. This
type of thinking encourages the judge to think about the merits and dis
advantages of federalism abstracted away from specific outcomes. Indeed,
this type of impartial thinking is exactly what we expect judges to do.
Both naive and tactical flip-flopping is a sign that an agent does not
apply the discipline of the veil of ignorance to her positions. The problem
with merely accusing the agent of flip-flopping is that it doesn’t tell us which
position the agent should adopt; it is just an accusation of bad faith or naivete.
The goal should be not just to shame the agent, but to force her to announce
a position on the norm based on an argument from behind the veil of
ignorance.

2. Puzzles.—The idea of a veil of ignorance is both time-honored and
appealing, but in the context at hand, it raises a series of puzzles. The first is
normative. To see the problem, consider a stylized example. Suppose that a
nation has two parties. Party A is usually in the majority, and it will be in the
majority for the relevant or foreseeable future (two years? four years? eight
years?). Party B represents the minority. Party A is committed to a program
that would reduce both welfare and liberty; Party B strenuously resists that
program. Let us stipulate that the veil of ignorance deprives both parties of
knowledge about which party is likely to be in power. If both were placed
behind the veil, they might, on plausible assumptions, choose a resolution
that gives the majority a great deal of power. If so, Party B should be entitled
to object that the veil leads to an unfortunate and possibly even catastrophic
outcome, and that if it is entitled to consider both its enduring minority status
and the welfare-reducing, liberty-impairing program of the majority, it would
insist on its current prerogatives.
On this view, the veil of ignorance is unhelpful, because it deprives
people of essential information. It is only with knowledge of the circum
stances (i.e., not behind a veil) that one knows what the right course is. Or
to put it another way, the veil of ignorance treats optimal constitutional
design as an exercise in ideal theory, where it might be better understood as
an exercise in nonideal theory. It might follow that the use of a veil of
decision making by afflicting the decision maker with uncertainty, which will result in decisions
that are equivalent to those made by an impartial decision maker).
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ignorance is helpful only if we benefit from having a degree of (unrealistic?)
agnosticism about the future electoral success of the parties and also about
which party is correct on the merits . 177 Is it clear that the veil should deprive
the parties of that knowledge? On imaginable assumptions, the veil could
produce outcomes inferior to those that would emerge if both parties know
what is in their self-interest.
The second problem is conceptual. Behind the veil, how can the parties
resolve their differences? What are the particular goals that a successful
resolution would promote? To narrow the inquiry, let us focus on a discrete
question that might be thought to be relatively easy: whether and when the
Senate should be authorized to filibuster Executive Branch nominees. To
answer that question, it seems clear that the parties would have to decide how
to balance the interest in allowing the President to select his own team against
the interest in ensuring against incompetent or extreme officials. While these
are the primary considerations, the parties might have to consider other
factors, such as the value (or not) of allowing “holds” as a means of extracting
Executive Branch concessions on other matters (“extraction authority”). To
come to terms with the full range of considerations, the parties would have
to consider, at a minimum, the following:
• whether and to what extent it is important for the President to have his
own nominees in place, or whether “acting” officials can essentially
do the job;
• whether and to what extent one or another adjustment to the filibuster
rules would increase the likelihood that the President could have his
own nominees in place;
• the seriousness of the risk that without certain uses of the filibuster,
incompetent or extreme nominees would be chosen or confirmed;
• the opportunity costs that come from time spent closely examining
executive nominees;
• the costs and benefits of allowing the Senate to have the extraction
authority that is associated with the power to hold nominees.
In the abstract, it is not simple to provide a disciplined answer to these
questions. On certain (plausible) assumptions, the Senate should essentially
allow the President to pick his team, and no kind of minority veto is justified.
Political safeguards constrain the President’s choices, and if a nominee is
genuinely incompetent or extreme, the Senate as a whole will not confirm
him. If so, there is no need to retain the ability to filibuster. On other
(plausible) assumptions, the filibuster is an important safeguard, and the
nation benefits from it. If political safeguards are otherwise imperfect, the
filibuster is a check against bad choices. Perhaps it is true that behind the
177. See id. at 402 (explaining that sometimes the information concealed by the veil of
ignorance may be valuable to the extent it outweighs benefits that may be obtained from neutrality
in decision making).
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veil, senators could agree that, all things considered, the filibuster should be
used exceedingly rarely in these cases. That judgment seems at least as
reasonable as any other. But it would reflect something like an informed
hunch about costs and benefits.
The third problem involves motivation and feasibility. Why, exactly,
would senators want to adopt a veil of ignorance?178 And exactly when, with
what kinds of discount rates for the future? In a specific year—say, this
one—the veil might not seem appealing to legislators who are concerned
above all with their own electoral prospects or who are focused above all on
the short-term consequences (avoiding disastrous consequences in the next
two years). If so, perhaps senators could agree that they will adopt a specific
resolution of an institutional question but only in a certain year—say, three
years hence. The advantage of this approach is that it would abstract from
current controversies, and no senator could know whether he would be helped
or hurt. A settlement by a future date would create the functional equivalent
of a veil of ignorance.
But senators who are now in the majority might well be ambivalent
about that approach. It would not do anything to resolve their current
problem, and if they anticipate being in the minority in the future, it might be
profoundly unappealing. And what incentive would the current minority
have to resolve the disagreement at that time? If members of the minority
believe that they will continue to be in the minority, they would not be drawn
to the idea of a settlement. Perhaps they would like the idea if they anticipate
being in the majority, but if so, the current majority may well anticipate being
in the future minority, in which case the question of feasibility returns.
In some respects, an immediate solution might seem more appealing.
At least from the standpoint of the majority, such a solution would eliminate
the existing problem and would be attractive for that reason. Of course, the
majority will be aware that any solution might end up harming it if it loses
its majority status. But that very awareness creates a kind of veil of
ignorance, whose effectiveness and reality turn on how much the majority
discounts the future.
In some cases, the parties will resolve a disagreement about a norm by
engaging in a deal. Bipartisan deals of this kind (or deals between branches)
are familiar from disputes about the budgetary process, the sharing of
Executive Branch information with Congress, and even filibustering.177

178. See id. at 428-30 (describing how veil rules in the Constitution control the legislature by
reducing the institutional “energy” of the legislature, assuming that self-interest is the “principal
spur to action”).
179. See, e.g., Helen Fessenden, The Limits o f Intelligence Reform, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dee.
2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2005-l 1-01/limits-intelligence-reform
[https://perma.cc/8U9P-GAZY] (detailing the deal struck by Congress and the Executive Branch
that resulted in intelligence-reform legislation in 2004); Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman,
Congressional Leaders Reach Deal on Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes
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What is the difference between deals and the veil of ignorance? Deals take
place when the two parties believe that resolution of the dispute about the
norm serves both parties’ interests (or the interests of party leaders or
majorities in each party). Thus, the deals may not necessarily advance the
public interest (though they may). A deal to limit campaign finance may, for
example, benefit incumbent members of both parties while harming
challengers of both parties. By contrast, the veil of ignorance encourages
agents to take a more public-spirited approach. It might also be seen as a
device for helping agents to see the perspective of their opponents.
3. A Procedure.—While we recognize these problems with the veil
construct, it nonetheless seems to us a useful method for thinking about flipflops. To be more specific, we propose a two-step procedure for identifying
and evaluating flip-flops.
In step one, we decide whether a purported flip-flop— an apparent
inconsistency in the positions about institutional values taken by an agent—
is a real one. In some cases, the inconsistency is only apparent, not real: the
agent can identify some additional institutional value, fact, or factor that
explains the apparent inconsistency. In other cases, the flip-flop is genuine—
it is naive or tactical. The existence of a naive or tactical flip-flop— or mul
tiple flip-flops by numerous agents in some policy domain— is of importance
because it shows that a constitutional or institutional norm is unsettled.
In step two, we demand that the agent provide a justification for her
institutional position. Typically, the agent will provide the justification from
behind the veil— that is, by appealing to public values rather than to the
agent’s self-interest. By applying the veil, we transform a debate mired in
political advantage taking into a debate about constitutional and institutional
values that transcend party affiliation. If a consensus emerges about the
optimality of a rule, then this is a strong argument in favor of that rule.
We do not contend that this two-step process will always work. For the
reasons we have sketched, merits bias and short-term incentives might
prevent members of Congress from taking the relevant questions seriously.
For analogous reasons, judges themselves might encounter some difficulty in
using the veil. But if unjustified flip-flops are to be avoided, the process
provides the best imaginable safeguard, with the exception of more formal
enforcement mechanisms to which we now turn.

.com/2014/12/10/us/politics/congressional-leaders-reach-deal-on-spending.html [http://perma.cc/
RVL4-S3L5] (describing the December 2014 spending package to fund most of the federal
government for the rest of fiscal year 2015, which included “more leeway for banks and other
financial services companies under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street regulatory law,” which was sought
by Republicans, while making some concessions to Democrats by not fighting, for example, rules
on nutritional content of school lunches and the President’s new immigration policy).
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How Are Institutional Norms Enforced?

Institutional flip-flops occur when people invoke institutional values in
order to support ideological or policy outcomes, changing their positions on
institutions whenever doing so supports immediate goals. Such flip-flopping
is troublesome because it suggests that the institutional rules do not matter.
But if they do not, the gains from optimal institutional design are lost, and
indeed, in the extreme one may wonder how political organization can be
possible. Thus, we turn in this subpart to the question of how institutional
flip-flopping can in fact be constrained (putting the veil of ignorance to one
side). In doing so, we collect and summarize some earlier observations and
survey some alternative theories as well.
1. Legal Enforcement.—We begin with, but will immediately dismiss,
one possible theory, which is that courts and other legal institutions should
constrain flip-flopping. The problem with this theory is that it is question
begging. In the domain that interests us the problem is precisely that people
must cooperate in the absence of legal enforcement. If senators avoid flip
flopping on the filibuster rules, it is not because the threat of judicial
enforcement. Indeed, judicial enforcement is in effect endogenous to the
problem that we study. When people object to court packing and other forms
of political control of the judiciary but then turn around and engage in just
this activity when in power, courts themselves cannot constrain them—the
degree of independence of the courts will itself be the outcome of the flip
flopping or absence of it.
2. Reputation.—A more fertile theory is that agents avoid flip-flopping
(or excessive flip-flopping) because flip-flopping may damage their
reputations or credibility. The mechanism is easy to understand. If Senator X
criticizes the filibuster when in the majority and lauds it when in the minority,
people may stop believing anything that Senator X says. And if people do
not believe Senator A, then she will have trouble persuading them to support
her proposals in the future. This mechanism is powerful enough that when
confronted with these contradictions, Senator A will always respond by trying
to distinguish the two settings. The plausibility of the distinctions that she
draws will help determine her credibility in the future.
3. Repeated Interaction.—A related theory is that agents avoid excessive
flip-flopping so as to maintain cooperative relationships with other agents.180
Suppose, for example, that senators do not know whether they will be in the

180. For an example of this style of argument, see Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil
The Political Foundations o f Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. L egal Stud . 59, VO72 (2003), which argues that a governing party’s willingness to allow judicial independence
increases as the party places more weight on fiiture payouts.
Turns. . .
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majority or in the minority after the next election. All senators believe that
they gain more through retention of the filibuster (protecting their interests in
the minority) than they lose (allowing them to prevail more often when in the
majority). The next majority may then retain the filibuster, expecting that if
it does not, the other party will retaliate by refusing to recognize the filibuster
when it reaches power. This theory will be even more powerful for
institutions like the Supreme Court, where a small number of people must
interact with each other over a long period of time and risk losing cooperative
gains if they flip-flop.
The reputation and repeated-interaction mechanisms are subject to wellknown limits. They tend to work best in small groups, when people expect
to interact with each other well into an indefinite future and when the gains
from violating norms are not too high. When the gains from exercising power
in violation of a norm are high enough, agents might choose to violate the
norm despite the reputational damage and the loss of future opportunities to
cooperate. For example, senators may not be willing to incur the reputational
cost from violating an antifilibuster norm for Supreme Court appointments
in normal cases; but if a particular appointment will change the ideological
majority of the court, they might believe that the damage to their party may
be greater than reputational costs from violating the norm. Partisan
cooperation—and the norms that sustain it— seems in general to be most
likely to break down just prior to elections, when elected officials might
violate norms because the alternative is to lose power, in which case
reputation does them no good.
Accordingly, flip-flopping is least likely in smaller institutions (courts
and the Senate rather than the House) and institutions whose members enjoy
long or indefinite terms (federal courts and some state courts). It is more
likely close to the end of terms than at the start of terms and when shocks
(wars, economic crises) radically increase the payoffs from violating settled
norms. And, as we have noted, flip-flopping will be more common when
norms are ambiguous than when they are clear, because reputational costs
and retaliation are easiest when a violation is clear.

4. Internalization.—Agents may avoid flip-flopping out of a simple
sense of self-respect.
We admire people who abide by principle
(“statesmen”) and disparage those who do not (“hacks”). It would not be
surprising if these public values were internalized by some or many people.
Internalization may not be subject to the small-group limits of the reputation
and repeated-interaction mechanisms. However, it may also be the case that
unprincipled people are drawn into the political arena (a selection effect) or
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that even principled people find it difficult to resist immediate pressure and
may rationalize their flip-flops to themselves (cognitive-dissonance
reduction).
5. Public Opinion.—Public opinion may constrain the ability of agents
to flip-flop. If the public cares about institutional rules, then it will
disapprove of those who try to manipulate them. But does the public have
institutional values? One study suggests that public approval of the Supreme
Court depends on whether the public approves of particular outcomes, not on
the jurisprudential quality of the opinions.181 This seems hardly surprising.
Still, politicians try to avoid the “flip-flopper” label, suggesting that the
prospect of public disapproval plays at least some role in constraining flipflopping.
6. Foreign Involvement.—Political agents may try to constrain flipflopping by seeking enforcement from foreign countries. A well-known
theory posits that when eastern European countries made the transition to
democracy in the 1990s, the initial wave of liberal leaders worried that
reactionary elements would initially agree to liberal constitutional reforms
but then flip-flop when those elements finally came to power.182 To forestall
such flip-flopping, these countries entered human rights treaties hoping that
the threat of foreign involvement would deter the reactionaries.183 Another
example is the use that some former British colonies make of the Privy
Council to settle internal disputes.184
Foreign involvement as an enforcement mechanism must itself be
subject to limits, given that the foreign countries that are empowered to
intervene may themselves refuse to obey the rules. For this reason, most
countries are not enthusiastic about yielding sovereignty to foreign countries
or international organizations.185

181. See Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact o f Opinion Content on Supreme Court
Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206,211 (2012) (discussing study results that suggest that the rationales
underlying Supreme Court opinions affect the Court’s public legitimacy to a lesser degree than case
outcomes).
182. Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and
Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. In t ’l Re l . 157, 166-67(1995).
183. Id. at 167.
184. See Role o f the JCPC, JUD. COMMITTEE PRIVY COUNCIL, https://www.jcpc.uk/about/roleof-the-jcpc.html#Commonwealth [https://perma.cc/FT9P-558Y] (identifying Commonwealth
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Conclusion
It is tempting to dismiss politicians, judges, and commentators as
hypocrites who constantly shift positions on institutional norms so as to
advance their electoral, political, or ideological interests. The temptation
should be resisted. In most cases, there is a consensus about institutional
rules which anchor debate and allow government to function. But when the
rules are ambiguous, flip-flops do arise. Unfortunately, ambiguity and hence
flip-flopping are present in many important settings. We have seen that real
or apparent flip-flopping can be found in recurring debates over the authority
of the President and the Supreme Court.
In our view, many flip-flops are a product of motivated reasoning and,
in particular, merits bias. Often the merits seem clear and, if so, one’s
judgments about institutional issues may be decisively influenced by one’s
judgments about the merits. We have identified highly suggestive evidence
of merits bias; we suspect that the phenomenon accounts for a large number
of flip-flops. But it is also true that institutional arguments are often
opportunistic and hence tactical. Because politicians are not usually
punished for making purely tactical arguments, and because they have strong
incentives either to oppose or support the incumbent president, a degree of
institutional flip-flopping is inevitable. Within courts, the constraints of
multimember tribunals and the occasional difficulty of achieving a fiveperson consensus on a single opinion also ensure a significant amount of flip
flopping.
Some of the most interesting flip-flops are a product of learning. In
principle, it is not simple to distinguish between motivated reasoning and
Bayesian updating. When people change their evaluations of a powerful
Presidency or judiciary, the two may be simultaneously involved. But there
is no question that when some people flip, it is because of a period of
disappointment with a particular allocation of institutional authority.
Sometimes, of course, the relevant learning is not pertinent to the question at
hand and hence does not justify the flip-flop. But to the extent that an
assessment of consequences legitimately bears on judgments about the
allocation of authority, flip-flops may turn out to be honorable.
In theory, there is a right answer to the question of what institutional
arrangements should be—whether, for example, it advances the public
interest if the Senate can filibuster presidential nominees. In practice,
however, the answer is often obscure, and agents are not always wellmotivated to implement that answer even if they can identify it. A
fundamental problem arises because an agent’s short-term substantive or
electoral interests may be inconsistent with reform of suboptimal institutional
arrangements. These problems give rise to both naive and tactical flip-flops.
The veil of ignorance offers a useful way of disciplining argument about
flip-flops. When agents cannot show that an apparent flip-flop is only
apparent, they are vulnerable to charges that they are naive or acting in bad
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faith. In some cases, these charges will carry some sting and help change
behavior. More important, when flip-flopping over a particular issue is
pervasive, we have an important signal that a constitutional or institutional
norm is unsettled.186
In that case, the veil of ignorance provides a useful device for forging
consensus on what norm should be recognized. With the help of the veil, one
can propose institutional norms that promote resolution of unproductive
disagreements and that are also fair because they give no advantage to those
on different sides of a partisan or policy divide. In this way, the long-term
(and common) interest in a well-functioning government that provides
benefits to all or most can be seen to outweigh the short-term advantage of
insisting on institutional norms that advance immediate political objectives.
In light of short-term incentives and merits bias itself, we have identified
significant obstacles to achieving the necessary consensus, but history
demonstrates that those obstacles can sometimes be overcome.

186. For more information on periods of constitutional uncertainty, see Sanford Levinson &
Jack M. Balkan, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. Rev . 707, 708-16 (2009); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa . L. Rev . 991, 993-1010 (2008).
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